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Costa Rica’s
Export Strategy:
The Real Problem
If Costa Rica’s export profile is nonsustainable, it is n o t for the reasons
detailed by Mary A. Clark in “Costa
Rica’s Export Strategy” (Hemisphere,
Sum m er 1992).
First, the Certificado de Abono
Tributario (CAT) is no t part o f the
new governm ent’s export strategy.
R ather, it is an old instrum ent that
tried to neutralize the export-inhibiting effects o f the form er im portsubstitution regim en. CATs are
incom patible with the G eneral
A greem ent on Tariffs and Trade
th at Costa Rica has joined; al
though beneficiaries obviously do
n o t want to see them disappear,
external pressure to elim inate
them will continue.
Second, the im plication that ris
ing im ports accom panied by rising
exports is bad does no t conform to
econom ic theory. Indeed, the m ain
benefit of increased exports is that
they allow increased im ports of
goods and services that can be
obtained from foreign sources at
better prices a n d /o r quality. A
m ore appropriate criticism o f the
m aquila industry is that it does not
foster the technical developm ent
o f a country and that it is relatively
footloose in the pursuit o f low
wages.
T hird, if nontraditional agricul
tural exports favor large foreign
firms, the econom ic dam age is no t
obvious. It is n o t self-evident that
a farm er working his own land ex
clusively is better off than a farm er
who is em ployed by a large farm
and works his own land part-time.
Employers have to pay the workers
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social benefits th at may no t accrue
to som eone who is working his own
land full-time. Wages may also be
better u n d er em ploym ent than the
im plied wage in self-employment.
Fourth, there is no evidence
that nontraditional agricultural ex
ports are m ore intensive in pesti
cide than are o th er crops. Indeed,
increasing evidence is being pub
lished on the detrim ental envi
ronm ental im pact of traditional
banana production. Further, the
climatic conditions required for a
given crop are the same in Costa
Rica as anywhere else; increased
pesticide use is n o t perforce m ore
necessary in Costa Rica than else
where. Environm ental degradation
is a problem o f agricultural produc
tion in general, n o t o f nontradi
tional export crops o r Costa Rica
in particular.
Finally, deforestation was oc
curring in Costa Rica long before
the em phasis on nontraditional ex
ports. Indeed, currently logged
areas are generally n o t suited for
export crops and are far away from
the transportation links th at are
critical to exports.
Perhaps the weakest p oint o f the
current Costa Rican export p ro
gram is that it does n o t foster the
technical developm ent o f its peo
ple. Alas, the au th o r does n o t m en
tion it.
Ed Canler
C hattanooga, Tennessee

CATs
Mr. C anler is wrong to assert that
the export-tax credit known as the
Certificado de A bono Tributario
(CAT) was no t a critical elem ent of
the nontraditional export push of
the 1980s. T he CAT was created in
1972 as part o f an effort to pro
m ote extraregional exports, but
they grew very slowly. C entral gov
ern m en t expenditures on CATs
boom ed after legislation was
passed in 1984 incorporating them
into a newly created package of
benefits awarded to nontraditional
exporters. As the m ain incentive of
fered in these export contracts, the
fiscal cost o f CAT subsidies in
creased rapidly to the levels I re
p o rt in the article.
In the late 1980s, the Arias ad
m inistration, as well as the W orld
Bank, recognized the nonsustain
ability o f these subsidies and ini
tiated negotiations with exporters
to reduce them . These efforts car
ried over into the Rafael Calderon
governm ent, which took office in
May 1990. Only on D ecem ber 1,
1992, did the Consejo Nacional de
Inversiones, acting on orders from
President C alderon, make the po
litically bold move o f elim inating
future CAT contracts. But because
the governm ent will h o n o r preexist
ing agreem ents to pay CAT subsi
dies, the system will constitute a
considerable b u rd en on the fiscal
budget for some time.

Import Costs

Reply: Yes, and No
The following is my response to Ed
C anler’s letter regarding my article
on Costa Rica in Hemisphere (Sum
m er 1992).

G ranted, a prim ary benefit of
added exports is the ability to in
crease im ports and my article
should no t be understood to sug
gest otherwise. R ather, in the dis
cussion concerning the cost of

im ported inputs associated with ex
p o rt production, I sought mainly to
encourage debate about the m erits
o f continuing tax-free entry of
these com ponents and considera
tion o f stiffer local content require
m ents for exports, as the first
implies forgone tax revenue and
the second m ight foster greater na
tional vertical integration in the
new industries. I make clear in the
article that I share Mr. C anler’s
concern with the footloose nature
o f assembly industries.

Nontraditional Agricultural
Exports and Small Farmers
H ere Mr. C anler’s objection really
only deals with the size o f producer
that m ight be m ost propitious for
nontraditional agricultural export
(NTAE) industries, n o t with the na
tionality o f such firms. In the last
paragraph o f this letter, I will relate
nationality to the problem o f tech
nical developm ent in agriculture.
Mr. C anler also limits him self to de
bate over the potential indirect ef
fects o f NTAE’s m arginalization of
small farm ing units. I will begin my
discussion on this level and then re
view the direct econom ic, social,
and political impacts felt in Costa
Rica as a result o f the transition to
a new set o f agricultural policies
begun in the 1980s.
It is conceivable that individual
farm ers m ight gain higher wages
by abandoning their own land and
working on a larger operation or
finding nonagricultural employ
m ent. But it would appear equally
probable th at families’ welfare
could decline as they lose access to
land. T here is evidence that larger
NTAE operations absorb propor
tionately less labor than smaller

units. In addition, em ploym ent on
these large farms is often seasonal
and working conditions can be
poor, although we would expect
labor legislation to be m ore effec
tive in Costa Rica than in o ther
C entral Am erican countries.
To date, we d o n ’t have the in
form ation required to show that
either o f these possibilities dom i
nates in reality and we may have to
m easure how the characteristics of
each crop affect key variables such
as labor intensity before drawing
conclusions. Meanwhile, we should
consider that the best option may
be to help small agriculturalists
grow NTAE crops on their own
farms because the smaller produc
tion units often absorb m ore labor.
Moreover, these families could then
hold on to their chief source of
wealth and security, land.
We know quite a bit about what
did happen to farm ers during Costa
Rica’s transition toward NTAE in
the 1980s. Agricultural policy
changes, driven m ore by govern
m ents’ efforts at crisis containm ent
than by a coherent developm ent
plan, created a situation in which
many farmers, especially small
ones, were forced to choose be
tween growing unfam iliar crops or
finding alternative forms o f subsis
tence. Reductions in support prices
for basic grains and reform ulation
o f the Sistema Bancario N acional’s

agricultural credit toward export
crops, particularly nontraditional
ones, encouraged some farm ers to
grow tropical fruits, spices, and or
nam ental plants w ithout adequate
risk assessment o r insurance pro
grams. O thers were pushed off
their land or out o f agriculture
altogether w ithout any kind o f as
sistance in m aking the transition to
alternative employm ent.
The ensuing econom ic catas
trophe and social dislocation in the
countryside provoked huge pro
tests by Costa Rica’s farm ers in the
late 1980s. In turn, the Arias gov
ernm ent found itself spending sub
stantial time and m oney seeking a
solution to the political disruption.

Pesticide Use and NTAE
Pesticides used in previous rounds
of export prom otion in Costa Rica
and o th er C entral Am erican coun
tries, particularly in bananas and
cotton, increased the resistance of
some pests, poisoned hum ans, and
harm ed the environm ent. Such
chemicals are clearly employed
m ore intensively in the newest agri
cultural exports than in the produc
tion of food crops such as corn and
beans. Researchers have already
docum ented problem s related to
pesticide use and NTAE crops in
several regional nations, partic
ularly in winter vegetables and
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Letters to the Editor

melons. M onocultural production
patterns, overuse stem m ing from a
variety o f causes (including the cul
tivation o f tem perate-zone crops in
the tropics where they encounter
new pest threats and the natural
predators o f the original climate
may be ab sen t), and poor govern
m en t regulation o f pesticides have
led to a vicious circle o f height
ened pest resistance and steppedup application in several countries.
For example, an explosion of
pests virtually collapsed the winter
vegetable industry and dam aged
m elon exports in the Dom inican
Republic in the late 1980s. The
same outcom e plagues the same
crops in Guatem ala and H onduras.
D uring the last six years, the US
Food and Drug Adm inistration re
jected thousands o f nontraditional
produce shipm ents from the Do
m inican Republic, Guatemala, and
Costa Rica for pesticide residue vio
lations. Costa Rican authorities,

the US Agency for International
Development, and m ultinational
exporters view this issue as serious
enough to w arrant their effort in
increased control over pesticide
use and educational program s for
growers.
A nother worrisome aspect of
the problem , at least in the short
term , is th at severe NTAE crop
losses due to pest outbreaks seem
to affect growers differentially. We
have evidence that large growers
and foreign firms often adjust pro
duction techniques o r relocate,
while smaller farm ers, often al
ready heavily indebted, are m ore
likely to lose their land w hen faced
with massive crop failure. Again, at
least in this transitional stage, diffi
culties associated with the relative
risk assum ed by different sizes of
NTAE growers, as well as the health
and environm ental impacts o f in
creased pesticide use, need to be
better addressed.
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Deforestation
Deforestation in Costa Rica is
largely a post-World W ar II phe
nom enon resulting in great part
from the previous ro u n d of NTAE
expansion, especially in beef cattle.
As ranchers cleared the land for
pasture and displaced peasants
burned down trees in their efforts
to eke ou t a living in the country
side, m uch o f Costa Rica’s forests
literally went up in smoke. Thus,
logging has n o t been the main
cause o f deforestation. Costa Rica’s
rem aining forests are highly en
dangered as an increasing landless
population seeks access to these
areas in order to survive and those
engaged in slash-and-burn agricul
ture m ust move on every few years
after exhausting fragile tropical
soils. T he cu rren t expansion in
banana and NTAE cultivation
only aggravates the problem
although the new crops do not
appear to be as land intensive as
cattle ranching.

Nontraditional Exports and
Technological Transfer
Finally, I couldn’t agree m ore with
Mr. C anler that too little attention
has been directed toward evalua
tion o f the potential contribution
o f Costa Rica’s cu rren t export drive
to the n atio n ’s technical develop
m ent. For this reason, I point out
in my article that Costa Rica’s as
sembly industries tend to offer lowskill jobs and rem ain disarticulated
from the rest of the economy. One
could also argue th at the national
ity o f nontraditional agricultural ex
p o rt firms operating in Costa Rica
is relevant to this issue. Because for
eign firms are n o t obliged to m eet
any technological transfer require
ments, it is unclear how m uch pro
duction and m arketing expertise
Costa Ricans will gain from their
presence.
Mary A. Clark
D epartm ent o f Political Science
University o f Wisconsin at Madison
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Conservation and Indigenismo
by Daniela Peluso

h en visiting native
federations in Ama
zonia today, it is no
longer uncom m on
to find some o f their
m em bers attending
conferences in E urope o r the US.
In recent years, many indigenous
Am azonian leaders have gained
considerable international recogni
tion working with foreign environ
mentalists, largely due to growing
acknow ledgem ent o f the potential
role o f indigenous peoples in the
conservation o f tropical forests.
T he international conservation
m ovem ent has indeed played a
valuable role in prom oting the de
velopm ent o f native Amazonian
federations. Nevertheless, basic
political and pragm atic problem s
arise from the interplay o f conser
vationist discourse with the con
struction o f ethnic identity by
indigenous peoples.
Environmentalists, developm ent
workers, an d anthropologists com 
monly associate the concept o f “na
tive p eo p le” with the stereotype of
the “ecologically noble savage” who
lives in perfect harm ony with na
ture. A lthough Am azonian cultures
do possess elaborate systems o f eco
logical knowledge, these do not
automatically translate into West
ern notions o f conservation with
sustainability at the top o f their
agenda. Still, this stereotype has
inform ed the policies o f foreign
environm ental agencies and con-

W

Daniela Peluso is a Ph.D. candidate
in the Department of Anthropology at
Columbia University. Since 1987 she
has been working directly with native
communities in Amazonia on issues of
conservation.
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sequently becom e an im portant
influence in the construction of
ethnic identity by indigenous peo
ples. If environm entalists grasped
the ironies between the cultural
values attributed to indigenous
peoples and the way those people
actually live, then environm ental
projects would stand a better
chance o f succeeding after the
developm ent professionals have
left the local sites.

Environmentalists
commonly associate
tike concept cf “native
I people” with the
I stereotype of the
“ecologically noble
savage ” who lives in
perfect harmony with
nature.

The Power of Imitation
Im itation is an im portant process
in the interactions between EuroAmerican, Latin American, mes
tizo, and indigenous cultures. For
example, indigenous groups enter
ing the regional m arket economy
typically im itate the tastes and prac
tices o f the dom inant local mestizo
culture in ord er to gain social ac
ceptance. Likewise, the mestizos
typically adopt the tastes and prac
tices o f the “whites,” who control
the supralocal flow o f credit, goods,

services, and profits that shapes
mestizo opportunities in the local
area. Thus mestizo settlers in the
Amazon have adopted single-crop
agriculture over that of crop diversi
fication—in spite o f higher costs
and reduced n utrition—because
they have been encouraged to do
so through the social incentives of
national econom ic and political
policies. T he mestizo example,
then, leads native com m unities to
adopt m onocropping as well.
T he process o f culture change
for Am azonian peoples has been
largely one o f im itating mestizo cul
ture, but a new elem ent has been
introduced as foreigners becom e
increasingly active in native com
m unities. Indigenous people now
often imitate what the conservation
ists want to see in them : an idealized
image o f the Indian past. In this re
gard, the native peoples may n o t
actually practice past customs, b u t
may merely appear as if they were
doing so. T he focus, then, is on the
image o f their cultural past as the
likeness o f the ecologically noble
savage.
Why is this projection o f the past
so powerful? Perhaps the reason
lies within the conservation agenda,
which has provided an alternative
discourse for native people in their
subordinate national positions.
Since the mid-1980s foreign envi
ronm ental organizations have tar
geted native peoples and their
federations as beneficiaries of
funds for program s o f sustainable
developm ent. T he funds tend to be
channeled to those native peoples
who employ sustainable practices
that the environm entalists regard
as involving community-based con
servation with potential m arket
value. W hen such native people do
n o t exist, the environm entalists in

vent them — or the native people in
vent themselves as “traditionalists.”
T he following scenario is an ex
am ple o f how the desire to pro
m ote sustainable developm ent
influences the response o f native
people to simulate their cultural
past. In many areas o f Amazonia,
indigenous com m unities have over
collected turtle eggs despite bodies
o f traditional knowledge that warn
against this ecologically unsound
behavior. W hen the representatives
o f a turtle conservation project
approach a native com m unity look
ing for local m odels o f preserva
tion, com m unity leaders may
respond by reciting the teachings
o f their elders a n d /o r by claiming
to still employ nonexploitative prac
tices o f both egg collection and
h unting—which, in some cases,
have actually n o t been practiced
for generations. T he local leaders
thereby satisfy the outsiders’ search
for “pristine,” “traditional” knowl
edge and enhance their own access
to First W orld resources. T he proc
ess o f em bracing their “Indianness”
is also a m eans o f bolstering the po
litical leverage o f native leaders in
relation to the mestizo population,
which dom inates the local Ama
zonian economies.
N ot all m em bers o f a given in
digenous com m unity are equally
interested in, or adept at, the po
litical strategy o f m im ing their
g ro u p ’s cultural past. T he m ost in
clined to this strategy are those per
sons whose activities and identities
are least b ound up with their
g ro u p ’s ethnic heritage. As articu
lation with the state ensues, native
com m unities perceive leadership
positions as best suited for those
m em bers who know how to speak
the language o f mestizos, are most
like them , and know how to deal

with them . Those m em bers o f na
tive com m unities who have these
characteristics are the very ones
that conservationists tend to adopt
as local project leaders.

These political and
cultural dynamics
strengthen the hand
of those segments
of indigenous
populations that
are least attached
to practices
of sustainable
development.

T he resulting com m unity dy
namics contain a basic irony. O n
the one hand, the m ost locally ori
ented o f the native people tend to
seek equal footing with mestizos by
adopting the tastes and customs
o f mestizo culture. O n the o ther
hand, the least locally oriented of
the natives tend to seek equal foot
ing with the mestizos by m im ing
the tastes and customs o f Indian
culture. T he foreign environm en
talists who prom ote what they as
sume are pristine indigenous
practices are rarely aware o f these
dynamics and their own key role as
outsiders in setting them in m otion.
In sum, as environm ental con
servation becomes a vital objective

o f developm ent professionals,
Am azonia’s native peoples are
com ing to regard their past as a re
source for altering their cu rren t
identity and enhancing their future
prospects. T hough they may cur
rently be subordinated to the local
mestizos, A m azonia’s native people
are discovering that Indian prac
tices and identity can give them
access to strategic political and eco
nom ic resources from the outside
world.

Policy Consequences
and Options
How does this option jeopardize
the success o f conservation projects
in Amazonia? Basically it does so by
strengthening the han d o f those
segm ents of indigenous popula
tions that are least attached to
practices o f sustainable tropical
m anagem ent, such as diversified
agriculture and reforestation. In
fact, these groups are the most
likely to engage in what, from an
environm ental standpoint, are u n 
desirable practices, such as m ono
cropping, cattle ranching, and pig
ownership. Given the local and ex
tralocal web o f discourse and
power, the native people who do
practice sustainable m anagem ent
are the least likely to possess the
knowledge o f W estern language
and culture that is necessary to ob
tain resources from environm ental
organizations.
Many anthropologists involved
with A m azonia’s native federations
are aware o f the contradiction be
tween the ethnic image and the
ethnic way o f life o f local leaders.
N onetheless, in light o f the exist
ing local inequalities o f wealth and
power—which underlie the limited
capacity o f true practitioners of
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sustainable m anagem ent to gain
recognition and resources from in
ternational environm entalists—
such anthropologists tend to over
look viable alternatives. W hat m ust
environm entalists do to mitigate
o r elim inate the problem ?
First, they m ust recognize that
native federations are no t “indige
nous” entities; rather, the federa
tions are m odeled after W estern
hierarchical structures and do not
represent all native people on
equal terms. In many cases it would
be appropriate for environm ental
ists to com bine work through na
tive federations with direct support
to com m unities, clusters o f house
holds, or individual families. For
exam ple, a project on turtle conser
vation could work with a com m u
nity elder who, though illiterate
and u n p rep ared for the tasks of
bureaucratic adm inistration, could
give workshops on m ethods o f tur
tle preservation.
Second, environm entalists m ust
expand their definition o f “indige
nous.” For instance, the Ribarerios,
who live on the Amazonian flood
plains o f P eru because o f displace
m en t d uring the rubber boom of
the n in eteen th century, are no t
considered “p u re ” native people,
even though their culture has dis
tinctly local features that include
sophisticated m ethods of sustain
able tropical agriculture. As native
groups interm arry am ong each
o th er and with mestizos and as the
native mimes the mestizo who is
m im ing the native, local ethnic
boundaries becom e increasingly
blurred. Do we incarcerate the
term “indigenous” by book-ending
it with the polarized and flawed cri
teria o f genetics on the one ex
trem e and politically based m im ing
o f the ethnic cultural past on the
other?
T he boundaries o f “indigenous”
culture change as cultural bounda
ries change in general. Recognition
o f the fluidity o f such boundaries is
vital in o u r quest to form ulate and
im plem ent effective, culturally ap
propriate m odels o f environm ental
conservation. ■

H em isphere • Winter/Spring 1993

Are you interested in
Central America?
If so, you will want to have a copy of the only media
directory covering Central America and Panama, the
1993 Gm'a de medios centroamericanos de
comunicacidn. This 220-page pocket-sized book
contains details on:
• O ver 300 m edia organizati
• M ore than 200 advertising
agencies and public
relations firm s
• Nearly 4,000 journalists
• 17 journalism schools and
their faculties
• Goverm ent and em bassy
press spokespersons

As well, there is useful
information, including
statistics and maps of the countries and major cities.
The price is $45 per copy, postage and handling
included.

Yes, send m e____ copies of the Guia de medios
centroamericanos de comunicacidn
Name:
_________________________________________________
Address:___________________________________________________ i
City/State: ________________________________________________ !
C ountry:_______ _______________________________________ ____

1

J

Make your check payable to CAJP Endowment Fund
and mail along with this coupon to:

[
i

Central American Journalism Program
Florida International University
3000 N.E. 145 Street
Miami, Florida 33181-3600

i

............. .............................. ........................ ..................... - ........................... j

.
[

Whither the Caribbean? Whither Florida?
by Mark B. Rosenberg

n Hemisphere s very first com
m entary in the fall o f 1988, edi
to r A nthony P. M aingot called
attention to critical issues fac
ing the Caribbean. H e then
w arned th at . . this region of
sovereign b u t balkanized and frag
ile states m ight be reaching the lim
its o f its privileged bargaining with
the US and the EEC . . . the Carib
bean states will have to com pete
economically like everyone else, or
at least create new noneconom ic ra
tionales for additional attention.”
T he collapse o f the socialist
system, the dem ise o f the Soviet
U nion, the disappearance o f the
T hird W orld as a political reality,
and rapid advances in inform ation
technology and econom ic globaliza
tion signal that the post-Cold War
realignm ent o f the world has be
gun. Now th at a new twenty-first
century agenda is im m inent, how
ever, the C aribbean runs an acute
risk o f irrelevance due to its diffi
culty in adapting to this rapidly
changing international environ
m ent.

Threats on All Sides
A glance at Caribbean Basin eco
nom ic o u tp u t is all that is required
to realize the precarious position
the region holds in the global
arena. T he sum o f the basin’s gross
dom estic p ro d u ct is bu t 20% o f the
state o f Florida’s output. This fig
ure reveals the reg ion’s principal
challenge: to construct a rationale
for continued econom ic involve
m en t in the area by the industrial
ized world.

Mark B. Rosenberg is an associate
editor o/'Hem isphere.

Past interest and involvement
in the Caribbean Basin by indus
trialized countries has been based
on colonial ties and security con
cerns, neither o f which is com 
pelling in a post-Cold W ar era.
Even though the end o f the Cold
War has brought with it a decline
in conflict between the G reat Pow
ers, the struggle am ong nations
and regions for im proved eco
nom ic well-being has only inten
sified.

Now that a new
twenty-first century
agenda is imminent,
the Caribbean runs
an acute risk of
irrelevance in a
rapidly changing
world.
——
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For the Caribbean, this new
world framework has created five
basic problem s, the m ost im m e
diate o f which is the Clinton
adm inistration. Even before the
Democratic Party captured the US
presidency in the 1992 election,
the Caribbean came u n d er blister
ing and unprecedented attacks
from both A1 Gore and Bill Clinton.
Listen to Gore on the popular tele
vision news program “N ightiine”
before a national audience: “I voted
against the Caribbean Basin Initia
tive when it was created. I thought
it was a mistake then, I think it’s

a mistake now . . . you have the
Bush adm inistration opposing ac
tivist policies to create jo b s here at
hom e, but supporting an industrial
policy for o th er countries to steal
jobs from the U nited States and
take them overseas” (Septem ber
30, 1992).
Days later, Clinton echoed
G ore’s attacks, when he declared
on Phil D onahue’s television talk
show that . . Reagan did that
[established the Caribbean Basin
Initiative] to prop up right-wing
governm ents that he agreed with
politically. . . . They used o ur tax
dollars to drive wages down in
America and to drive wages down
in C entral America . . . ” (O ctober
6, 1992).
W hat better indication for the
Caribbean that a new era had ar
rived? In a presidential campaign
that was remarkably devoid o f de
bate about international issues and
foreign policy, one o f the few inter
national topics to em erge in the dis
course was the Caribbean, and it
did so negatively. C oupled with the
prevailing anti-Caribbean feelings
am ong m any W ashington bureau
crats, this anti-Caribbean sentim ent
has created a crew o f hard en ed
hearts in the key trade-related agen
cies o f the US governm ent such as
the Latin America offices o f the US
T rade Representative, the D epart
m ent o f Com merce, and the De
partm ent o f State.
These currents o f anti-Caribbean sentim ent in the US govern
m ent parallel and are reinforced
by a new US approach to trade pol
icy, which had already begun to sur
face in the latter days o f the Bush
presidency. Casting aside the Cold
W ar-oriented “preferential access”
approaches to international trade,
the Clinton adm inistration is
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clearly favoring trade arrange
m ents based on “com parable ac
cess” o r “reciprocity.” Thus, few
interests in W ashington these days
are disposed to prom ote or m ain
tain trade agreem ents that are
one-way in nature. CBI-style ar
rangem ents are relics of the past;
a new era of hard-ball trade politics
has begun.
Evidence of these threats is the
prospect o f a N orth Am erican Free
T rade A greem ent (NAFTA). As US
tariffs on Mexican products, such
as textiles, are elim inated, NAFTA
is expected to divert the flow of
both trade and investm ent away
from the C aribbean to Mexico,
thereby dim inishing the value of
Caribbean-privileged access to the
US m arket through the Caribbean
Basin Initiative (CBI). T he pros
pect o f NAFTA at first dem oralized
C aribbean leadership. Now there is
a certain resignation to its inevita
bility.
A nother potential threat to the
Caribbean is a capitalist Cuba.
W hen the island nation shifts to a
m arket economy, it will first seek to
export sugar to the US and then
seek foreign investm ent to develop
an assembly-manufacturing capac
ity. Both of these sectors in Cuba
are already competitive by any
standard. W hich Caribbean Basin
countries will be asked to give up a
portion o f their dim inishing sugar
quota? W hich assembly plants will
relocate from one Caribbean
export platform to another? O f
course, Cuba will also appeal great
ly to US tourists seeking new and
m ore exotic C aribbean beaches.
H ence, the re-entry o f Cuba into
the capitalist world m arket—hardly
a decimal p oint in global econom ic
statistics—will have profound impli
cations for Caribbean m arket rela
tions and competitiveness.
Beyond the hem isphere, the his
torical trading patterns between
Europe and the C aribbean—pre
served for the past 20 years by the
Lom e Conventions and the n o n 
reciprocal guaranteed access to
E uropean markets they provided—
are th reaten ed by the consolida
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tion o f the Single E uropean Market
(SEM). A prim ary objective of the
SEM is to institute a unified tariff
structure for European imports,
which will confront the bilateral
trading arrangem ents on which the
Lome Conventions and their proto
cols have been based.

NAFTA would
threaten both the
principal export
markets of the
Caribbean and
Florida’s role as the
hub of North-South
trade.

C urrent negotiations o f the U ru
guay R ound o f the G eneral Agree
m ent on Tariffs and Trade include
a m uch debated proposal to phase
out the quota system— the MultiFibre A rrangem ent (MFA)— that
has m anaged to restrain Asian tex
tile and apparel producers from
furthering their dom inance o f the
world market. Elim ination of the
MFA over the 10-year period u n d er
consideration would expose an in
creasingly vital econom ic sector of
the C aribbean region to intensified
global com petition.

The Caribbean, NAFTA, and the
Florida Connection
The im m ediate dilem ma, however,
revolves around the likely im pact
o f NAFTA on the C aribbean as
well as the possibility of crafting a
response that can be supported in
both W ashington and the Carib
bean. Erosion of preferential
access to the US m arket and di
version of investm ent are the prin
cipal short-term NAFTA challenges
to the C aribbean Basin. T he bene

fits gained through the CBI would
n o t be reduced p er se, b u t the com
petitive position o f CBI countries
would deteriorate because of Mex
ico’s increased access to the US
market.
T he size of M exico’s m arket, its
proximity to the US, and its lower
production costs and ab undant
natural resources constitute an
in h eren t competitive advantage
oyer the Caribbean Basin coun
tries. These advantages, coupled
with the elim ination o f tariffs and
quotas on Mexican products en ter
ing the US m arket, create the po
tential for a general reorientation
of trade away from the Caribbean
towards Mexico. This shift would
threaten both the principal export
m arkets o f the Caribbean and Flor
ida’s role as the hub o f NorthSouth trade in the hem isphere.
In response to this new set of
challenges, Congressm an Sam Gib
bons (D-FL) has proposed legisla
tion (HR 1403) to assure NAFTA
parity for CBI countries. T he p ur
pose o f the bill is to ensure that the
CBI is not adversely affected by the
im plem entation o f NAFTA and to
apply fast-track approval to free
trade agreem ents between the US
and certain Caribbean Basin coun
tries.
This legislation is im portant for
Florida because it will help to pro
tect jobs in both the Caribbean
and Florida. An estim ated 80,000
jobs in the state are directly linked
to CBI-related trade. Given that
CBI countries account for m ore
than 30% o f Florida exports and
20% o f Florida im ports, and given
that Florida’s econom ic welfare in
general is intim ately tied to Carib
bean prosperity, passage of this bill
could be as im portant to Florida as
it is to the Caribbean.
Although the destinies o f Flor
ida and the Caribbean are tightly
intertw ined through trade and
com m erce, there have been few
systematic efforts by either side to
em brace the o ther as a strategy for
enhancing their com m on in terna
tional competitiveness and eco
nom ic well-being. This em brace

m ust occur if Florida and the Carib
bean are to benefit from the shift
ing international forces that are
driving econom ies and peoples to
g ether th ro u g h o u t the globe.
At a m inim um , a strategic con
sensus between Florida and the
C aribbean should identify and pro
m ote com m on linkages and inter
ests. While such a consensus m ust
be g rounded in self-interest, its
prem ise would be the notion that
in terd ep en d en ce and transna
tional politics are now realities o f
the global landscape.
To move from rhetoric to ac
tion, recognition o f the num erous
obstacles to the developm ent o f a
b roader strategic consensus and ac
tion plan for Florida and the Carib
bean is necessary. W hat are these
obstacles?

The First Obstacle
To begin with, Florida possesses
only a nascent capacity to articulate
and im plem ent a strategic vision of
the state’s stake in the world econ
omy and the specific regional ar
rangem ents th at can prom ote
Florida’s competitive advantages.
T here has been little serious atten
tion to the international linkages
th at could improve Florida’s global
competitiveness, in large part a re
flection o f the grip that traditional
protectionist interests hold on the
m achinery o f the state’s govern
m ent. T he problem also reflects
the limited understanding that Flor
id a’s private-sector leaders have of
the w orld’s dram atic econom ic
transform ations, and the fact that
the Caribbean constituency in Flor
ida is diffuse and weak.
T he absence o f a strong Carib
bean constituency in Florida is strik
ing in view o f the state’s position as
the C aribbean’s leading US export
p artn er (about $4 billion in 1990).
In the com ing years, Texas (in sec
o nd place at $1.2 billion) will be
totally focused on trade with Mex
ico. Despite its rhetoric, Louisiana
(in third place at $1 billion) is es
sentially a protectionist state and is
directly competitive with the Carib

bean in the production o f strategic
com m odities such as sugar. O ther
states, such as Georgia, now export
as m uch to Mexico as they do to
the entire basin. In short, there are
few jurisdictions in the US with
deep trade connections to the
Caribbean.

The Second Obstacle
A nother Florida-Caribbean prob
lem is that the C aribbean has been
tardy in grasping the regional impli
cations o f the en d of the Cold War.
Now that the spur o f national secu
rity no longer motivates US policy
in the region, the C aribbean faces
the indifferent attitude that has
periodically characterized US for
eign policy toward Latin America.
In this setting, however, the Carib
bean region and C entral America
have yet to orchestrate an effective,
com m on agenda in W ashington.
This problem is n o t new, but u n d er
cu rren t conditions any Caribbean

Basin agenda in W ashington will
be particularly difficult to sustain.
C aribbean Basin efforts have
been oriented to the w orld’s trade
capitals—W ashington, Geneva,
London, even San Juan. Although
Florida essentially serves as the
trade capital o f the Caribbean, Car
ibbean leaders have done little to
integrate Florida into the alliances
necessary to advance their com
m on interests in the global market.
In the task o f reorienting the
C aribbean’s vision and alliances,
there is little time to waste. T he Cu
ban time bom b is ticking, and the
Caribbean and Florida m ust act to
gether, no t only to minim ize the
negative im pact o f US-Mexican
free trade on the C aribbean Basin,
b u t also to prepare to com pete in a
world o f open markets. Mexico is
first in the free trade line b u t will
certainly no t be the last. Both the
C aribbean and Florida m ust recog
nize and adapt to this changing
environm ent. ■
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Russia and Latin America
by Vladimir P. Sudarev

Still, from the 1960s to the
an Russia replace the
1980s the USSR created a diversi
USSR in Latin America?
fied structure o f presence in Latin
Although the answer is
America, which included diplo
apparently negative, the
matic and econom ic missions, as
m atter is far from simple.
well as program s o f technical as
With respect n o t only to
sistance and cultural exchange.
Cuba but to Latin America in gen
eral, Russia is the USSR’s foreignpolicy successor. T he building of
Russian-Latin A m erican relations
requires a new design, though
some o f the old Soviet structures
Now that
rem ain useful.
the East-West
Latin Am erica’s im portance to
the USSR was largely based on the
confrontation has
quest for strategic balance with the
US and in the Cold W ar setting of
ended, Russia—in
political and ideological rivalry.
Cuba and Nicaragua were the aces
many respects, quite
in this game, in which the Soviet
a different state from
leadership tried to avoid open con
frontation and its concom itant
that of theformer
risks. T he principal long-term ob
jectives o f Soviet strategy were the
Soviet Union—is
creation o f low-intensity security
searching to redefine
problem s for the US in its own
backyard, the creation o f a show
its international role.
case for “real” socialism in Cuba,
and the support o f leftist move
m ents th ro u g h o ut Latin America.
Latin America itself, however,
was o f little interest to the USSR.
After all, how m uch did the super
Am ong o ther things, the USSR
power o f the East have in com m on
m anaged to penetrate Latin Am er
with fragile dem ocracies situated in
ica’s regional weapons m arket, be
the backyard o f the superpow er of
com ing, for instance, the key
the West? T he m argins for Sovietsupplier o f aircraft and tanks to
Latin Am erican cooperation were
Peru. T hough Soviet-Latin Ameri
very narrow indeed, a fact o f which
can trade rarely exceeded $500 mil
the Soviets were well aware.
lion and usually carried a negative
balance for the Soviets, it did, at
times, assume strategic im portance.
So it was in the early 1980s, when
Vladimir P. Sudarev is director of the
Jim m y C arter im posed an em bargo
Department of International Relations
on the sale o f US cereals to the So
at the Institute of Latin American
viet U nion. A rgentina becam e the
Studies in Moscow. His recent publi
USSR’s m ajor cereals supplier and
cations include Russia and Latin
the value o f Soviet-Latin Am erican
America: Towards a New P artner
trade escalated.
ship (Moscow, 1992).
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The Next Step?
Now that the East-West confronta
tion has ended, Russia—in many re
spects, quite a different state from
that o f the form er Soviet U nion—is
searching to define its role in the
em erging post-Cold War order.
Russian leadership is clearly inter
ested in establishing partnerships
with the W estern democracies.
This interest is part o f the obses
sion, as often declared by foreign
m inister A ndrei Kozirev, th at Rus
sia m ust becom e a “norm al great
power”—fully integrated with the
industrialized N orth o f the new
global order. Such integration is
hardly possible, at least for the fore
seeable future.
Why is it unlikely th at Russia will
becom e a m em ber of the n o rth ern
industrial club? To begin with, Rus
sian foreign policy m ust n o t only
adapt itself to the country’s histori
cal, territorial, and dem ographic
dim ensions and its Euro-Asian
geostrategic position. In addition,
its foreign policy m ust acknow
ledge the country’s curren t phase
o f socioeconom ic transition and
crisis.
It would be illusory to suppose
that the only solution to Russia’s
socioeconom ic transition and crisis
would be to integrate with the
West, even if this m eans taking the
role o f a weak partner. Such inte
gration is today hardly realistic,
given the fundam ental differences
between Russian and western stages
o f industrial developm ent, a dis
advantage not taken into account
by form er prim e m inister Egor
G aidar’s attem pt to jum p-start a
Russian open-m arket economy. In
a headlong dive into the econom ic
seas o f the West, Russia could well
sink to the depths o f long-term

subordination, relegating itself to
the sem iperiphery o f the post-Cold
War order. In light o f this vulner
ability, a m ore desirable option for
Russian policy today would be to
m ap out an open, m uldfaceted
course o f action that leaves behind
the form er Soviet obsession with es
tablishing a worldwide superpower
presence. Russia’s relations with
the West would becom e m ore open
and m ultifaceted if they were to em 
brace n o t only the western indus
trial powers b u t the reinvigorated
econom ies and fledgling dem ocra
cies o f Latin America as well.
Against this backdrop, Russia
and m uch o f Latin America sur
prisingly converge on a num ber of
issues. At the core o f these is the in
term ediate position o f both Russia
and a substantial portion o f Latin
America in the new world hierar
chy. Thus, as Russia becom es the
“S outh” o f the N orth, the majority
o f Latin A m erican countries are
striving to becom e the “N o rth ” of
the South. Russia is ju st now enter
ing the path toward a dem ocratic
polity and a m arket economy, upon
which Latin Am erican countries
such as Mexico, Chile, Argentina,
and Brazil have already traveled a
considerable distance.
What, then, can Russia learn
from Latin A m erica’s “state capital
ism ,” a stage th at Russian reformists
tried to leap over in 1992? W hat
can Russia learn from Latin A m er
ica about the social costs o f neo
liberal reforms, strategies for
m anaging the foreign debt prob
lem, and the pitfalls o f dem ocratiza
tion? Latin A m erica’s track record
in these and o th er spheres is m ore
germ ane to the form ulation o f Rus
sian policy than are the past and
present track records o f W estern
Europe or the Asian dragons.

In short, Russia and m uch o f
Latin America face the same basic
challenges in the em erging new
global order. Am ong these are the
threats o f marginalization, in the
world economy, technological de
pendence, and foreign debt. In
many respects, Russia and Latin
America are becom ing “natural
partners.”

Russia and much
of Latin America face
the same basic global
challenges, such as the
threats of economic
marginalization,
technological
dependence, and
foreign debt

For example, with the possible
exception o f Chile, the Latin Am er
ican countries o f the Southern
Cone and the Andes could well
rem ain outside o f the em erging
N orth Am erican m egabloc for the
foreseeable future. A lthough Mer
cosur was formally included in the
Bush adm inistration’s Enterprise
for the Americas Initiative, it ap
pears that for the time being this
bloc has virtually no chance of
grafting itself onto the N orth
American Free T rade A greem ent,

which in the com ing decade will
revolve around the absorption o f
Mexico. This scenario parallels
that o f Europe, where, in spite of
a Russian vision o f a new political
and econom ic space “from the
Atlantic to the Urals,” it is unlikely
that even Eastern Europe will be
com e integrated with the Euro
pean Com munity (EC) during the
1990s.
A nother parallel exists in the
realm o f technology. For instance,
in view o f the growing im portance
o f advanced technologies o f com 
m unication, A rgentina and Brazil
could consum e a wide array o f
Russian products and expertise,
which the A rgentines and Brazil
ians could obtain on m ore favor
able term s from Russia than from
the West. Likewise, Russia badly
needs access to the interm ediate
technologies involved in light in
dustry, which it can potentially
acquire from Latin Am erica on
m ore favorable term s than from
the West. At both levels, moreover,
there are possibilities not only for
“technological b arter,” bu t also for
jo in t ventures in assimilating and
producing new technologies.
Does this equation leave out
Mexico? N ot at all, since Russia’s
long-term policy planning m ust
somehow incorporate the em er
gence o f the huge new econom ic
space that encompasses the Ameri
can and Asian sides o f the Pacific
Rim, within which Mexico is poised
to assume a greatly enlarged role.
Hence, conditions may be favor
able for the establishm ent o f a
“Pacific bridge” between Russia
and Mexico, which previously had
insignificant econom ic ties with the
Soviet U nion. T he Russian region
of the Far East, which rem ains
practically unexplored by Latin
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Reports: After the Cold War

Am erican business interests, could
em erge as a significant m arket for
Latin Am erica’s traditional and
nontraditional exports, especially
from Mexico.

Problems and Solutions
To be sure, even with recognition
o f such potential bilateral gains,
Russian-Latin Am erican trade faces
obstacles such as comparatively
high transportation costs and diffi
cult financing. M ore im portant,
however, is th at Russia’s new leader
ship has assum ed the Soviet leader
ship’s m arginal interest in Latin
America. Indeed, only through his
participation in the Ju n e 1992 UN
E nvironm ental Sum m it in Brazil
and side trips to Venezuela and Ar
gentina did Russian vice president
A lexander Rutskoi discover where
Latin Am erica is heading and its
relevance to Russian options. And
Russia’s trade delegations and eco

nom ic missions, inherited as they
are from the Soviet bureaucracy,
continue to reflect the inefficien
cies o f a state-controlled econom y
whose trade with Latin America,
outside o f Cuba, was minuscule.
But times change. Many Latin
A m erican countries are opening
their m arkets and pursuing aggres
sive export policies. To some ex
ten t the same is taking place in
Russia. N onetheless, Russia and
Latin America continue to know
little about each o th e r’s econom ies
and the trade opportunities they
contain. A starting point would be
the establishm ent o f small, bilat
eral initiatives th at lay the founda
tion for Russian-Latin American
business links.
O ne possible bridge for Russian
trade with Latin Am erica is the US,
by way o f Florida, with its highly
developed network of Latin Ameri
can contacts. T he utilization o f this
potential bridge is contingent on

the solution o f the “C uban prob
lem .” As a successor to the USSR,
Russia is deeply enm eshed in
Cuba. Incoherent, even clumsy,
attem pts to adjust Russia’s relations
with Fidel Castro in 1991-92 did
nothing positive for Russian diplo
macy and led to Russian econom ic
losses.
Nevertheless, the Russian-Cuban
trade agreem ent o f November
1992 reflects a m ovem ent toward
m ore balanced long-term relations.
Given its new relations with the US
and the EC, as well as its continu
ing econom ic, technical, and cul
tural links with Cuba, Russia may
becom e a m ajor player in the proc
ess of redefining C uba’s relations
with the world in general. The
beneficiaries would include n o t
only Cuba and the US, b u t also
Russia through the expansion
and deepening o f its participation
in the post-Cold W ar world econ
omy. ■

A MAJOR CHARITABLE GIFT OPPORTUNITY FOR THE RIGHT PHILANTHROPIST
The MEDICAL, EYE & DENTAL INTERNATIONAL CARE ORGANIZATION, Inc., an independent 501 (c)3
organization based in Austin, Texas, has sent 274 volunteers from throughout the United States to
remote areas of Central Am erica providing free health, dental and vision care to nearly 20,000
poverty stricken children, men and women. Since being chartered in August of 1990, members of
twenty M E D I C.O. teams have spent one week of their tim e, sharing their concern and talents at
their own expense. M.E.D.I.C.O. has been recognized by Honduran government a nd m edical
authorities as a significant contributor in their nation's health care program. M.E.D.I.C.O. has seven
teams scheduled for 1993, including tw o special surgical teams.
To date, M.E.D.I.C.O. has been administered by volunteers. The growth and success of the
program now requires the services of a full-time administrator and an endow m ent to financially
support this position.
The founders and volunteers of M.E.D.I.C.O. invite contributions from major potential donors to help
underwrite the operational costs of this much needed and expanding program. With a proven
track record, the opportunity to be an integral part of a heartwarm ing successful humanitarian
foundation is very real.
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For More Information, Contact:
Norm Peters, Chairman, Board of Directors
M.E.D.I.C.O.,Inc.
11Q7 Majn street, Georgetown, Texas 78626
Telephone (512) 863-8217 or fax (512) 863-8666.
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Germany and Latin America
by Violanda Botet

n O ctober 1991 G erm an chan
cellor H elm ut Kohl took his
first extended foreign trip fol
lowing G erm an reunification
to, o f all places, Brazil and
Chile. The 12-day tour was
one o f Kohl’s longest trips abroad
and the first trip by a G erm an
chancellor to Latin America since
H elm ut Schm idt visited the region
in 1979. In speeches and private
talks Kohl m ade clear the polidcal
significance o f his trip: Germ any is
n o t self-absorbed and the new, re
unified Germ any intends to rem ain
actively engaged in Latin America
and the T hird World.
T he chancellor m ade two sig
nificant statem ents during the trip.
T he first was th at the reunified Ger
many recognized a “growing re
sponsibility” in the world and that
he ho p ed Latin America, and par
ticularly the countries of Brazil and
Chile, would becom e its “privi
leged” partners. T he second was
his confirm ation of an earlier
pledge to donate a quarter o f a bil
lion Deutsche marks to Brazil to
p rotect its tropical rain forests.
Kohl’s pledge to pursue and
expand G erm any’s ties to Latin
Am erica attracted surprisingly little
criticism in the G erm an press,
given th at the G erm an governm ent
had assum ed trem endous new fi
nancial obligations and th at dom es
tic econom ic growth was slowing.
To be sure, G erm any’s foreign pri
orities rem ain the W estern alliance
and Eastern Europe. T he push for
expanded Germ an-Latin American

Violanda Botet is an attorney adviser
with the US Department of State. The
views expressed in the article are hers
alone and do not necessarily represent
those of the US government.
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relations, however, is partly a re
sponse to Latin Am erica’s im
proved econom ic and political
situation in the 1990s.
More broadly, Germ any is selec
tively strengthening its political ties
in regions such as Latin America,
provided that the financial costs
are m oderate and that the G erm an
governm ent gains the opportunity
to take a m ore p rom inent role on
political issues it regards as falling
within its particular areas o f exper
tise. Am ong these issues are the
environm ent, trade, and the tran
sition from planned to m arket
economies.

Latin America’s
process of
democratization
and adoption of
free-market policies
have reawakened
German interest.

How Much Is Too Much?
After the US, Germ any is the West
ern power with the strongest in
terest in Latin America. O f all the
E uropean countries, Germ any con
ducts the largest volume o f trade
and invests the m ost m oney in
Latin America, as well as contribut
ing the m ost developm ent aid to
the region. G erm any’s cultural
links are strong as well. More than
five m illion Latin Am erican citi
zens are o f G erm an descent. In
addition, G erm an political foun

dations, political parties, churches,
and trade unions are active in the
region.
Even so, Germ any has been criti
cized since W orld War II for lack
ing a clear foreign policy agenda
in Latin America. Some observers
have discerned an overemphasis
on foreign trade, cultural ex
change, and developm ent aid at
the expense o f a broader and m ore
m eaningful political dialogue. Fol
lowing C hancellor Schim dt’s visit
to Latin America in 1979, Ger
m any’s interest in the region was
especially high and the relation
ship seem ed poised for a takeoff.
T he launch never occurred, how
ever, the principal reason being
the deterioration o f the Latin
American econom ies in the 1980s.
In recent years, though, Latin
Am erica’s process o f dem ocratiza
tion and adoption o f free-m arket
reform s have reawakened G erm an
interest. Further, the G erm an ex
perience o f m anaging the transi
tion from a planned economy to a
m arket economy in the country’s
new eastern states has sensitized its
policymakers to the painful choices
that Latin A m erica’s dem ocratizing
regimes face. By the same token,
Latin Am erican leaders are soberly
reassessing the need to make their
industries m ore competitive in
light of the th reat that the form a
tion of the E uropean Com munity
(EC) and the opening o f Eastern
Europe may divert foreign trade
and investm ent away from Latin
America.
Over the past three decades,
Latin A m erica’s share o f W estern
E uropean im ports and exports de
clined by half. And since 80% of
Latin Am erican exports to the EC
consist o f prim ary com m odities
such as agricultural products and
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m inerals, Latin A m erica’s balance
o f trade with Europe is becom ing
m ore vulnerable than ever. The
key factors are the possibility of
new EC agricultural preferences
for Eastern Europe; o f a m ore pro
tected agricultural m arket in the
EC if the Uruguay R ound o f the
G eneral A greem ent on Tariffs and
T rade fails; and o f increased com
petition and stricter regulations
with the EC’s consolidation.
Kohl’s 1991 trip to Latin Am er
ica reflects Germ any’s attem pt to
carve o u t for itself a new extraE uropean role in the post-Cold War
order. W ithin Europe, Germ an
foreign policy has moved dram ati
cally from the “West” orientation of
the Cold War to a m ore balanced
“W est/E ast” orientation. The
em erging question is, what interest
does Germ any have in the rest of
the world?
C hancellor Kohl’s pledge to
increase cooperation with and aid
to Latin America appears, to some
observers, o u t o f sync given the cur
re n t strains in the G erm an econ
omy and the preoccupation o f the
G erm an political establishm ent
with Eastern Europe and the new
Soviet republics. Still, there are
o th er factors th at prom pt the Ger
m an governm ent to expand its rela
tions with Latin America. To begin
with, Latin A m erican dem ocratiza
tion is a fragile process and Ger
many has a long-term tangible
interest in keeping the region sta
ble. It is n o t inconceivable that
Latin America could revert to the
festering trouble spot that it was
for years, heightening the myriad
problem s like the d ebt crisis, drug
trafficking, social and political
strife, militarization, and hum anrights abuse. In a world in which
transnational problem s increas
ingly originate in countries where
governm ents are too weak to con
trol dom estic problem s, analysts in
the G erm an foreign ministry argue
that, over the long term , it makes
sense for Germ any to m ake at least
some m inim al econom ic conces
sions now to prom ote Latin Amer
ica’s dem ocratization process. They

m aintain that view despite the feel
ing that G erm any’s own resources
are overextended in Europe.
Likewise, the G erm an govern
m ent recognizes that the US is in
creasingly reluctant, o r unable, to
play a leading geostrategic role in
m ultiple areas o f the world simulta
neously. This recognition is alter
ing the assum ption that the US
has the exclusive responsibility of
stabilizing Latin America. In the
future, then, there will be increas
ing pressure on the EC to aid Latin
America. In this context, the US
governm ent is looking increasingly
to wealthy allies such as Germ any
and the EC to increase their re
gional assistance to Latin America,
particularly in regard to the re
g ion’s debt problem .
W hether Europe will com m it it
self to m eeting the challenge in the
Americas is a basic question. The
Europeans, however, are not insen
sitive to a certain sense o f diplo
matic justice, since they are calling
for US help in stopping the very
same categories o f threats—politi
cal instability, massive international
im m igration, and lost econom ic
opportunities—in Eastern Europe.
T he urgency o f the reform s being
undertaken simultaneously in East
ern Europe and Latin America may
provide incentives for W estern Eu
rope and the US to diversify their
traditional spheres o f geostrategic
interest.
O n a bilateral level, Germ any’s
principal goals in Latin America
are going beyond the reinforce
m ent o f econom ic and cultural
ties to encompass a concerted
effort to encourage dem ocratiza
tion. T he G erm ans see their role as
that o f providing political support
to fledgling dem ocracies struggling
to carry o u t painful econom ic re
forms. T he G erm an governm ent
and G erm an political foundations
(e.g., the Konrad A denauer and
Frederick Ebert Foundations) will
also step up their efforts to help
Latin Am erican regimes to “techno
cratize” their dem ocratic structures
through political education and
civil-administration reform . Ger

m any’s own dem ocratization since
W orld War IT and its cu rren t partici
pation in the political reform s of
Eastern Europe give it a certain
nuts-and-bolts approach to dem oc
racy. In Latin America—which tra
ditionally has been long on theory
b u t short on im plem entation— the
Germ ans can serve a potentially
useful role.
In the econom ic arena, Ger
m any wants to increase its trade
with Latin America and offer tech
nical assistance in debt and tax re
structuring. With regard to trade,
the post-World War II develop
m ent o f an export-driven Germ an
econom y is also widely adm ired
in Latin America and serves as a
social-market econom y m odel. This
m odel is particularly significant to
day since, in view o f the social dis
locations, econom ic problem s, and
political threats associated with
structural adjustm ent policies in
Latin America, the G erm an socialm arket economy, as opposed to
the US free-m arket economy, is an
attractive option to many Latin
Americans.
T he core them e o f GermanLatin Am erican relations in the
com ing decade will be th at o f stabi
lizing the new dem ocracies in the
region and bolstering mutually ad
vantageous trade relations. Increas
ingly, G erm an relations with Latin
America will also be shaped by deci
sions m ade at both the EC and bi
lateral levels. T he m ain th reat to
German-Latin Am erican relations
comes n o t so m uch from a p o ten
tial loss o f interest on eith er side,
bu t from events in Latin America
itself. Political regression in Latin
America o r its failure to com pete
successfully in trade and invest
m ent markets in W estern Europe,
N orth America, Eastern Europe,
and East Asia would derail Ger
m any’s recent initiative and once
again pull the two sides apart. ■

Editor’s Note: Abridged version of an
article originally published in the
German foreign relations journal
Aussenpolitik (January 1993).
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Teeing Off: Dwight, JFK, and Fidel
by Douglas Murphy

n the opening m onths o f 1961
relations between the US and
Cuba rapidly deteriorated. A
brazen revolutionary leader
seized prized US possessions
on his island. Two US presi
dents, staunch defenders o f these
assets, angrily watched his moves.
Tensions flared. Political ties
strained, then snapped. A nd at
last, on M arch 31, a small band
o f soldiers, poorly trained for the
task at hand, storm ed onto a beach
front area n ear Havana to chal
lenge an overwhelming opponent.
After hours o f fierce com bat, the
m ism atched skirmish mercifully
en d ed and analysis immediately be
gan. Most experts concluded that it
was an ill-fated mission from the
start. Even the caddy agreed that,
when it came to golf, Fidel Castro
was no J o h n F. Kennedy.
This scenario was not, o f course,
the Bay o f Pigs fiasco, which u n 
folded several weeks later. Instead
it was a series o f political m aneu
vers that centered on the gam e of
golf. For m ore than three m onths
US and C uban leaders waged an allo u t tu rf war with the sport. While
the Bay o f Pigs assault dem on
strated the intensity o f US-Cuban
animosity, golf revealed some of
the “grass roots” activities behind
the event.

I

Political Links
As Fidel C astro’s revolution swept
th rough Cuba in the 1950s, golf
underw ent its own radical changes
to the north. In earlier years few
Americans possessed the extra

Douglas Murphy is a Ph.D. candidate
in Latin American history at the Univer
sity of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
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m oney and leisure time necessary
to support the golf habit, a pastime
previously confined to exclusive
country clubs.
As US industries boom ed after
W orld War II, however, m ore and
m ore workers rose to jo in the blos
soming m iddle class, seeking out
the perks and pleasures that came
with higher incom e and a shorter
work week. O ne o f the m ost popu
lar o f these was golf, a game that
enticed enthusiasts with m ore
courses, cheaper equipm ent, and
all the innovations o f m odern tech
nology. In a little m ore than a
decade, repatriated soldiers and
form er guardians of the hom e
front becam e an army o f civilian
golfers—dressed in new uniform s,
arm ed with m ass-produced clubs,
and firing ever m ore aerodynam ic
projectiles.
Dwight D. Eisenhower—war
hero, president, and real general—
led the m arch by honing his duffer
skills as often as his high office per
m itted. By 1960, with his second
term winding to a disturbing close,
he took to the course m ore and

m ore frequently to get a brief res
pite from Cold War pressures.
Photographs of the president in
golfing attire, club in hand, be
came such a freq u en t sight that
Fidel Castro—one o f the m ain irri
tations o f Eisenhower’s final days—
criticized him as an incapable
m anager who could only chase
the little white ball ( Time, April 7,
1961).
O f course Castro hardly rep re
sented an im partial critic o f either
Eisenhower o r his sport. Since the
revolutionary seized power, he con
stantly challenged the US presi
dent, charging him with im perialist
motive, confiscating US industries
and property, and seeking ties with
Eisenhower’s o ther great nemesis,
the USSR.
Likewise, Castro already had ex
pressed ill will towards the game of
golf. In contrast to his support of
o th er sports, he denou n ced golf as
a “game o f the idle rich and exploit
ers o f the peo p le” (New York Times,
March 31, 1961).
T he links between these two dis
putes touched the heart o f C astro’s
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revolutionary goals. After gaining
control o f Cuba in 1958, Castro im
mediately set about toppling the
elites and foreigners who con
trolled the island’s agriculture,
industry, and politics. In a parallel
thrust, he attacked the social trap
pings o f this influence. O n the one
hand, he tried to abolish the drink
ing, gambling, and debauchery
th at had becom e a drawing card
for foreigners. O n the other, he
determ ined that, once free from
oppression and vice, all Cubans
would have equal access to the re
m aining social, cultural, and sport
ing facilities.
Golf fell prey to this program
on all fronts. Two o f the islands
largest landowners, the sugar giants
U nited Fruit and Hershey, owned
several courses for use by their
m anagers. W hen these com panies
and the Eisenhower adm inistration
protested C uba’s expropriation of
property, Castro responded by set
ting his sights on their land-rich
leisure areas.
Some golfers also attracted at
tention u n d er new program s to
elim inate vice. Previously foreign
tourists en tertained themselves
with some daytime swinging before
descending on the casinos and
cabarets for an evening o f rum ,
roulette, and prostitution. Castro
m ade it clear th at this type o f visi
tor was no longer welcome in the
new Cuba.
But it was the exclusive, private
clubs o f the island th at incurred
the m ost outrage and sealed the
case against the game. At the time
o f the revolution, m ost Cubans
lived in squalor. For these im pover
ished masses, places like the Biltm ore Yacht and Country Club and
the Havana C ountry Club—with
their grand houses, finely groom ed
grounds, and wealthy clienteles—
shone as beacons o f excess am idst
the island’s general malaise.
M ore directly, country club
m em bership lists bore the nam es
o f many prem ier enem ies o f the
revolution, including deposed pres
ident Fulgencio Batista. And it was
in the carefully landscaped country

T im e , April 7, 1961

club neighborhoods, behind the
closed curtains o f darkened m an
sions, that the last serious resis
tance to revolution held forth as
Castro’s forces storm ed into H a
vana. If he allowed clubs to rem ain
intact, Castro only invited plots
against his power.
In light o f the gam e’s m ulti
faceted disfavor, C astro’s first blows
against golf appear restrained. He
nationalized several clubs, declar
ing them the property o f all the
C uban people. The form erly USowned Biltmore Club, for example,
opened its expropriated grounds
and beach to any citizen who cared
to enter. Avid golfers were wel
com e to continue their pastim e on
the now unkem pt and dirty fair

ways. T hough few chose to do so,
even form er m em bers could pay a
fee to use the turf.
If Castro ever considered m ain
taining golf as an acceptable Cu
ban sport, activity to the n o rth
probably changed his mind. O n
January 3, 1961, ju st days before
Kennedy assumed the presidency,
Eisenhower severed relations with
Cuba. Already frustrated by Cas
tro ’s continued intransigence, the
president drew the line when the
revolutionary leader dem anded a
reduction o f the US embassy staff
in Havana. Eisenhower kept the
event in perspective, though, by
com pleting 18 holes before drop
ping the axe (Time,January 13,
1961).
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In the following weeks, despite
the worst rift ever in US-Cuban
relations, golf again seized the
Am erican spotlight. As their na
tion moved towards arm ed conflict
with their next-door neighbor, in
quiring m inds wanted to know who
played better, Jack o r Ike? News
magazines recalled K ennedy’s his
tory as a freshm an golfer at H ar
vard. P hotographers scram bled for
snapshots o f the president-elect’s
scorecard. R eporters asked leaders
o f politics, business, and industry
for opinions on how the new lead
er o f the free world m ight uphold
Eisenhower’s legacy on the links.
Even when Castro broke into
the news, the national craze en
gulfed him. O ne political cartoon
portrayed the change o f White
House occupancy as an exchange
o f m em bership at the “B urning
Problem s Country C lub” ( Time,
January 27, 1961). T here, in addi
tion to the arms race, the Cold War,
and assorted o th e r’issues, new
player Jack faced Nikita Khrush
chev’s cigar-smoking “Caddy Cas
tro ” with his bag of clubs and
sickles.
Despite the challenging course
before him and lingering doubts
about his skills, Kennedy asserted
him self on both the country club
and political turfs. As Eisenhower
bid the nation farewell, with a
speech at the Augusta Country
Club, Kennedy quickly took up the
big sticks. O n the political front he
continued to press Cuba to respect
US interests and influence. At the
same time, though shrouding his
game in secrecy, he received praise
in the press and Congress for keep
ing golf the “Presidential Gam e.”
Kennedy also m atched his prede
cessor at handling golf and Castro
in the same stroke. Even before
taking the oath o f office, reporters
spied the youthful president teeing
off while in d eep discussion with
the form er US am bassador to Cuba.
W hen Eisenhower severed ties with
the island the president-elect
golfed and conferred with his ad
visers, b u t did n o t challenge the
move.
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For Castro and his supporters,
who saw their dem ands for respect
taking a back seat to presidential
play, the US obsession with golf sug
gested a lack o f concern with Cu
ban relations. At the same time it
offered itself as a source o f revolu
tionary symbolism. In the magazine
Bohemia (January 15, 1961), for ex
ample, a cartoonist sketched “Golf
Latinoam ericano.” H ere a smiling
m an swung a sledge ham m er to
drive away the severed ball and
chain o f “Yankee Aggression.”

For Castro and his
supporters, the US
obsession with golf
suggested a lack of
concern with Cuban
relations and offered
itself as a source
of revolutionary
symbolism.

T he gam e’s refuges in Cuba also
attracted m ore aggressive interest.
T he Havana C ountry Club, once
famous for its annual “Red Ball”—
a form al event where guests and
m em bers decked themselves in
crim son and scarlet—now saw the
color in a new light. M embers, who
had always insisted that Castro was
Com munist, received word that he
had confiscated their entire neigh
borhood. T he club becam e an
academy o f arts while the luxurious
surrounding hom es were pressed
into service as barracks for revolu
tionary youth.
O th er golfing centers also fell.
T he Cubanican recreation center,
once the Biltmore Club, began to
convert its links into m ore prole
tarian playing fields. T he once

beautiful greens and fairways al
ready bore scars from antiaircraft
batteries positioned to ward off an
expected US attack.
Finally, attention came to rest
upon the Colinas de Villarreal Golf
Club, across from Havana. Castro
nationalized this site, planning to
m ake it an additional workers’
social center. But first he saw a
chance to swipe the golfing initia
tive from US politicians.

Tee Time, Revolutionary Style
O n M arch 31, 1961, decked out in
military fatigues, boots, and beret,
and arm ed only with golf clubs and
his tradem ark cigar, the Cuban
leader played his first and only
round of golf. Industry m inister
Ernesto “C he” Guevara and agrar
ian reform director A ntonio Nunez
Jim enez arrived in similar style to
com plete a sporting triumvirate.
With crowds o f reporters on hand
to record the m om ent, the trio
took up positions on the first tee.
Any weekend golfer could have
predicted the ensuing rout. Even
with one quarter o f the m anpower
involved in the first battle o f the
revolution, Castro could n o t pull
ou t a victory. Che, who h ad cad
died as a teenager in Argentina,
won with a passable 127 score on
the par 70 course. N unez logged a
180 total. Castro, the rebel who
once took refuge in the rugged
C uban m ountains, found that the
rolling fairways hid little but his
ball. At the end of his ro und, the
soldier retreated from the field with
a tally o f m ore than 150 strokes
(Newsweek, April 10, 1961).
Despite this hum bling Revolu
tionary O pen, the duffers m ain
tained high spirits. After beating
his partners on the first hole, Cas
tro boasted he could easily beat
Kennedy. In a similar position on
the second green, Che swore he
could steal a m atch from Eisen
hower. N ot to be outdone, Nunez
expressed confidence he could pre
vail in head-to-head com petition
with the president of U nited Fruit
Company. All this in contradiction

o f their caddy’s claim that they
could n o t even top the reporters
covering the occasion.
Castro, no doubt, secretly agreed
with the caddy, but he had reason
to portray his ro u n d as a political
coup. In less than 200 fell swoops,
he m anaged to ridicule two US
presidents, foreign business inter
ests in Cuba, and a large portion of
the US population, while mimick
ing the lack o f serious attention
paid to Cuba by golfing politicians.
With the real th reat o f a US inva
sion hanging over his island, Cas
tro scoffed at the peril with an
outing on the links.
Castro’s ro u n d received a mixed
reception in the US. N either Eisen
hower n o r Kennedy graced the
event with a com m ent. The New
York Times (March 31, 1961) as
sured its readers that Kennedy
and Eisenhower shot in the 70s
and 80s respectively and faced no
real threat from the revolution
aries. And Thom as Sunderland,
who headed the U nited Fruit Com
pany, accepted the jib e in good
hum or. H e issued a press release
stating that, based upon his typical
displays on the course, he would
n o t be surprised to lose to Nunez.
If Kennedy h o p ed to retake the
golfing high ground, his next move
failed entirely. T he week following
C astro’s round, the president flew
off for a holiday at the Kennedy
estate in Palm Beach, Florida.
While he consulted with his advis
ers, he allowed the press to photo
graph him on the golf course for
the first time in his presidency
( Time, April 14, 1961). T he occa
sion proved disastrous, however, as
his first tee shot hooked wide onto
an adjacent fairway. A second at
tem pt bounced off the head o f a
Secret Service agent. Luckily for all
present, Kennedy staffers had al
ready restricted press coverage to
the first tee and any fu rth er mis
haps escaped public scrutiny.
As Kennedy forced analysts to
revise their opinions o f his golfing
prowess, Castro continued to revel
in his own round. In a speech to
university students in Havana, he

announced that at last he had done
enough to “deprestige” the game
o f golf (Bohemia, April 16, 1961).
But he also noted new possibilities
for the sport. “Now,” he added,
“when Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Eisen
hower want to discuss their prob
lems with us, we’ll play a gam e o f
golf.” H e also assured his audience
that, with a few days o f practice, he
could guarantee a victory.

In less than 200fell
szvoops, Castro
managed to ridicule
two US presidents,
foreign business
interests in Cuba,
and a large portion
of the US population,
while mimicking
the lack of serious
attention paid to Cuba
by golfing politicians.
O f course, the fairways and
greens could n o t contain the con
flict. Even as Castro proposed his
power sum m it on the links, ships,
warplanes, and diplom ats from
both countries challenged each
o th er and the two nations rushed
towards arm ed conflict. Ju st days
after C astro’s speech reached the
press, US-backed Cuban rebels
landed at Playa Giron in an at
tem pt to establish a beachhead for
counterrevolution.
Faced with the old, familiar haz
ards, Castro again proved to be a
better politician and soldier than
golfer. With little difficulty, he ral
lied the support o f Cuban citizens
while his forces crushed the at
tackers huddled at the shoreline.
Castro finished the day firmly in
control o f his island.

Delinking and Relinking
The Bay o f Pigs operation effec
tively drew the union o f golf and
US-Cuban politics to a bloody close
To the north, US officials and citi
zens continued their fascination
with the links. In Cuba several
courses rem ained open, with the
Cuban press occasionally ph o to 
graphing campesinos and workers
perfecting their swings. Yet Castro
never dabbled in the sport again.
He had dem onstrated his true
skills before a m uch larger gallery.
And since Cuba had now asserted
itself as a country that dem anded
m ore than a few words between
golf swings, the gam e fell from the
political forefront.
From the standpoint o f the
1990s, however, Castro may have
won a round, bu t lost the m atch.
As the Cold War putts to a halt,
a new generation o f Americans
watches the Cuban governm ent
drift into political and econom ic
isolation. In defiance o f this drift,
Castro now offers a green revolu
tion. In a city o f limited social pleas
ures, the few foreign diplom ats and
investors who venture to Havana
are encouraged to enjoy its rem ain
ing clubs and links. W estern tour
ists, with pockets full o f money, are
invited to try C uban golf as part o f
a Caribbean holiday. T hree dec
ades after condem ning the game
and jeerin g its enthusiasts, Castro
is trying to use golf to prop up his
regim e and to assert C uban in
dependence from its n o rth ern
neighbor.
Nonetheless, m ost Caribbean
countries have found that the suc
cess o f golf resorts and o th er tour
ist ventures depends on a steady
flow o f guests from the US. Cuba,
though attracting its share o f visi
tors, rem ains off limits to Am eri
cans—a policy unlikely to change
as long as Castro rem ains in power.
Golf holidays for Canadians and
Europeans may help Cuba to delay
the retu rn o f US influence, b u t it is
the golfing colossus to the n o rth
that seems destined to determ ine
the island’s future course. ■
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Reports: Gender and Migration

Haitian Women in Miami
by Sue Chaffee

“O ooh, God is taking care o f me
today. Yeah, my God send m e here.
He show m e the way and now I
have to do my part. T h at’s how God
works. T hat m an m ight act crazy
for selling m e all this m aterial for
little m oney, b u t it was God that
m ade him do it. W hen God see me
walking by the m an table, he tell
the m an, ‘sell all this to h e r.’ O h, I
have so many things to be thankful
for because of my G od.”

“Everyday I’ll do this. Get up in the
m orning and cut m aterial. W hen I
have a pile like this I’ll sew them .
Sew them , p u t elastic on the waist,
little snaps because I d o n ’t have
m oney for buttons, so I’ll make lit
tle snaps. And th en I can sell them .
God find me som ething good to
d o .”

Sue Chaffee is a graduate student in
comparative sociology and anthropology
at Florida International University. She
is currently researching the economic
strategies of Haitian women and the
role of networking in their survival.
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“Se Ben passed by my house yesterday. She bring many
things— turkey, milk, tom ato paste, bread—many things.
T he day before that she was in my house and saw th at I
d id n ’t have these things in my refrigerator. S he’s my friend.
T hank God I have h er in my life.”

“I’m so happy Jesula rents my little apartm ent.
W hen she was in Haiti, I miss h er so m uch.
Everyday I cry for her. Now she’s back and my
heart feels kontan (happy)

“W hen I was in Haiti I feel bad because my Mom d oesn’t have
good h at for h er church. I want to send h er som ething like
this in the box I send next week.”
“My m o th er always told m e when
it’s M other’s Day and you are a
m other, you are supposed to make
som ething nice for your children
so they feel special. I have to do
th at even if I have only a little
money. They need a new wob
(dress) so they d o n ’t feel bored. If
they go to church and see the
o th er children in new clothes and
they d o n ’t have them then they
m ight feel bad. I want them to feel
special. My m o th er did that for me
when I was a little girl in Haiti. She
always m ade m e feel special.”
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Insider briefs on people and institutions
shaping Latin American and Caribbean affairs

Where Logic Defies Politics
T he April 1993 appointm ent of
R oberto Robaina to head C uba’s
Foreign Ministry set off a wave of
reactions from Cuba observers. As
the youngest m em ber o f the Com
m unist Party’s Politburo, the 37year-old’s experience is lim ited to
rising th rough party ranks within
the U nion o f Young Communists.
Even a Radio Havana com m en
tator, Miguel de la Guardia, noted
th at “the diplom atic com m unity
in H avana received the appoint
m en t with surprise.” W hat is per
haps even m ore surprising is that
R obaina replaced career diplom at
Ricardo Alarcon, who earlier had
been nam ed to the largely cerem o
nious position o f president o f Cu
b a ’s legislature— the National
Assembly. Some observers inter
p ret R obaina’s appointm ent as an
attem pt to signal the start o f a re
newal process within the govern
m en t th rough the arrival o f a new
generation o f leaders.

Watch Out I
Jam aica continues to lose ground
in its struggle against violence. Ac
cording to an Americas Watch
rep o rt (April 1993), “the fear of
crim e continues to deepen . . . par
ticularly vexing for the population
is the theft o f crops and livestock
. . . giving rise to fits, vigilante
justice and sometimes police
violence.” But the issue o f civil
violence extends to a deeper con
cern—state violence. T he rep o rt
states th at the “level of police

Edited by Mark B. Rosenberg
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violence is extrem ely high; killings
by police [in the last four years]
have constituted 22 percent o f all
hom icides in Jam aica (the num ber
o f killings by police that are justi
fied is unknow n).”

Sing Along
Inspired by the success and tech
nology of “U nforgettable”— the re
cent musical hit in which Natalie
Cole sings with h er long deceased
father, N at “King” Cole—C uban
singer and com poser Pablo Mi
lanes will also try recording with
the dead. It is a bold and, some
will no doubt say, pretentious move
by “Pablito,” for he has picked as
singing partners two o f the m ost
venerated figures o f the Cuban
musical pantheon: Benny M ore
and M iguelito Cuni. Milanes has
selected ten recordings (five by
each o f the two legendary singers)
and will be adding his own voice in
a sophisticated sound studio in the
Dom inican Republic. T he album
will be distributed internationally
by Polygram Records in mid-1993.
T he production launches the Pablo
Milanes Foundation, a nongovern
m ental, nonprofit, self-financed
institution designed to prom ote cul
tural and artistic events. Since it is
apparently not officially tied to the
Cuban governm ent, it would seem
to be an entity with few precedents
in C uba’s recent history.

Where Politics Defies Logic
W hen Bill Clinton was elected pres
ident, he prom ised a different
“look” for his adm inistration. O ne

of his m ore novel attem pts to fulfill
this cam paign prom ise was the half
hearted and ill-fated effort to nam e
Mario Baeza, a New York lawyer, as
assistant secretary o f state for interAm erican affairs. Even before the
likely nom inee could get to Wash
ington to display his credentials, a
chorus o f opposition developed in
Miami and W ashington. A ppar
ently Baeza was n o t well-known to
Miami’s Cuban-Americans, espe
cially Democrats. At issue were the
lawyer’s sympathies toward Castro,
his connections with com panies
seeking business on the island, and
his absence o f familiarity with “the
Cuban-American agenda.” Many
also believe that race played a
subtle factor—Baeza is black.
After weeks o f delay and ambiva
lence, the Baeza nom ination was
dropped by Clinton and his advis
ers, who were not eager to fight for
a position that, at most, has sym
bolic im portance in W hite House
decisionmaking.

US Policy Is Working . . .
or Is It?
Before the US trade em bargo on
Haiti, m erchandise trade between
the two countries totaled $820 mil
lion (1990). By 1992, however,
trade had d ropped by m ore than
half to only $322 million. O f this
am ount, US exports were largely
com posed o f rice, wheat, and
sugar, while im ports were mainly
com prised of finished textile prod
ucts. H aiti’s GDP fell 10% in 1992.
T he Haitian assembly industry has
been hardest hit, with em ploym ent
in that key industry falling from a
pre-em bargo high of nearly 32,000
workers to only 12,000.

Watch Out II
Many o f your favorite Axnway prod
ucts are now available in A rgentina.
T he company, based in Michigan,
recently op en ed Amway centers in
Buenos Aires, Rosario, Cordoba,
and M endoza.The direct-sales con
sum er products com pany is already
operating in Mexico, C entral Am er
ica, and Brazil, and expects to sell
m ore than $10 million worth o f its
products in A rgentina during 1993.

The Caribbean Connection
T he Miami-based C aribbean Satel
lite Network (CSN) had its debut
in D ecem ber 1992. T he first and
only television network to deliver
Caribbean program m ing 24 hours
a day, its program s focus on Carib
bean news, sports such as cricket
and soccer, and Caribbean music
videos, with em phasis on reggae,
soca, calypso, and Latin and o ther
roots music. A lthough well-received
in the Caribbean, CSN has no t yet
been picked up by any US cable
companies.

Good Analysis
Some o f the best analyses on the
potential plight o f the Caribbean
in the face o f the N orth Am erican
Free T rade A greem ent (NAFTA)
com e from M anchester Trade, a
W ashington-based international
business advisory group. Directed
by S tephen Lande, a lawyer and for
m er official in the office o f the US
T rade Representative, M anchester
has organized a “Friends o f the
C aribbean” network to lobby for

the new Caribbean Basin Free
T rade Agreem ents Act. T he legis
lation would provide some guar
antees for Caribbean countries
against the trade and investm ent
diversion that NAFTA, if and when
it is signed, may bring.
■

Worth Reading
Business Mexico is a m onthly publica
tion o f the Am erican C ham ber of
Com m erce o f Mexico. Its winter
1993 special edition carries articles
on topics ranging from “Balancing
M exico’s N atural H eritage with Its
Developm ent F u tu re” b y j. M artin
Goebel o f the W orld Wildlife Fund,
to “T he N ature o f Good Business”
by L. Susan A nderson o f the Na
ture Conservancy.

Fiber Optics Frenzy?
A $1 billion fiber optics network
will link Latin America, the US, and
the European Com munity by late
1994, according to an article in the
Journal of Commerce (May 19, 1993).
T he article quotes an AT&T offi
cial: “T here will be a double digit
com pounding increase in traffic
over the next couple o f years once
we deploy fiber optics to the whole
region. . . . T he growth will be a
self-feeding situation.” T he main
obstacle to the network is, of
course, financing. While many
Latin Am erican countries are
m odernizing their phone systems,
about $30 billion will n eed to be in
vested annually in telecom m unica
tions in Africa, Asia, and Latin
America to be competitive in the
global economy.

Check It Out
The Revista Bigott focuses its entire
O ctober-D ecem ber 1992 issue on
tobacco in the Americas. Published
in Caracas, the slick m agazine has
10 articles on the origins and uses
o f tobacco in the Americas. Am ong
the authors is Guillerm o C abrera
Infante, whose article “Puro h u m o ”
is fram ed by m ulticolor replications
o f the w orld’s m ost intricate cigar
w rapper bands. For those who love
cigars, this issue is a collector’s
item.

Musica Caliente
MTV Music Television has an
nounced that it will initiate a 24h o u r Spanish-language network,
based in Miami. T he new network
will be m arketed to 12 to 34-yearold Hispanics and will also be
offered to cable operators th rough
out Latin America and some parts
o f the Caribbean. T he network will
debut in O ctober 1993.

Free Fall
Ricardo Arias C alderon, formerly
P anam a’s vice president and now
leader o f the opposition to Presi
d en t Guillerm o Endara, should
have thought twice before resign
ing his governm ent position. Since
he left the governm ent in Decem 
ber 1992, the Christian D em ocrat’s
popularity has plum m eted from
18.7% in April 1992 to 7.5% in
April 1993. T he poll, conducted
by the D ichter and Neira Company
o f Panam a City, was based on inter
views with 1,200 Panam anians.
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Peru: Into a Black Hole
by Luis Pasara

Is Peru the most tragic exception to an emerging profile of Latin American
democratic consolidation? Or is it, in extremeform, a portent of a regional
future of social polarization and political violence?
he popular election o f a
constituent assembly in
November 1992 created
the im pression that Peru
had retu rn ed to a state of
political calm and stabil
ity. In fact, Peru is still painfully
dragging itself through the worst
stage in its history. T he proposed
new constitution—which would be
drafted by a congressional majority
loyal to the dictates o f President
Alberto Fujimori—does no t repre
sent a way o u t o f the current im
broglio.
Unlike Chile—where the suc
cess o f dem ocratization reflects the
chance convergence of the mili
tary’s withdrawal from power and
an econom ic u p tu rn —contem po
rary P eru ’s experience with the op
eration o f chance has been entirely
negative. Natural disasters, such as
the two-year d ro u ght currently af
flicting the country, contribute to
P eru ’s bad fortune. Most o f its cur
re n t problem s, however, are dis
tinctly hum an in origin.
Since the mid-1970s Peru has suf
fered an econom ic collapse that

T

Luis Pasara is a research associate at
the Centro Latinoamericano para el
Analisis de la Democracia, in Buenos
Aires, Argentina. His publications in
clude “El rol del parlamento: Argentina
y Peru, ”Desarrollo Econom ico
(January-March 1993).

26

H em isphere. Winter/Spring 1993

places its current GDP per capita at
1950 levels. T he governm ent’s fail
ure to handle the econom ic situa
tion has exacerbated a very grave
process o f deinstitutionalization by
which the effective authority o f the
state is greatly reduced and the ef
fective authority o f guerrillas (i.e.,
Sendero Luminoso) expands to fill

Popular disaffection
with political parties
is massive, fueled by
the perception that
they serve only a
narrow band of
interests.

the gap. In this setting, Fujimori
has em erged as a caudillo who en
joys the approval approval o f a sig
nificant portion o f the electorate.
In short, P eru finds that it has a
state whose effective authority is
fast eroding.
T he military governm ent of
Morales Berm udez (1975-80) and
the popularly elected governm ents

of Fernando Belaunde (1980-85),
Alan Garcia (1985-90), and Alberto
Fujimori (1990-) im posed drastic
adjustm ent program s th at failed to
elim inate inflation, clean up public
finances, o r reestablish the u n d er
pinnings o f sustainable econom ic
growth. This sequence o f adminis
trations has created a disturbing
profile o f the Peruvian economy:
chronically high inflation; a tre
m endous decline in the value of
econom ic output; a huge increase
in the share that drug revenues
represent in the national economy
and in its exports; a massive debt
burden; and a fiscally bankrupt
state. In 1992—after m ore than
two years o f Fujim ori’s shock treat
m ent— the value o f P eru ’s GDP fell
for the fourth consecutive time and
the rate of inflation hovered
around 60%. As a result, 17.6 mil
lion o f P eru ’s 22 m illion people
currently live in poverty and, of
those, nearly 11 m illion are in
digent.
N ot surprisingly, then, popular
disaffection with political parties is
massive, fueled by the perception
that political parties—w hether in
or ou t o f office—have served only
their own narrow interests regard
less o f the plight o f the nation. For
example, in a 1990 survey o f m id
dle to lower-class residents in Lima,
94% o f the respondents agreed
with the statem ent th at “the people
have always been tricked by the
politicians.”

Political opposition, especially
on the left, used the econom ic diffi
culties o f the country to exert m ulti
ple dem ands w ithout considering
what is possible. These dem ands
have mainly been for higher sala
ries and the preservation o f gov
ern m en t spending program s. The
rejection o f any governm ent initia
tive, the systematic and prem ature
denial o f any positive result from
the policies adopted, and the in
crease in social conflict have be
com e useful tools for those who
hope to take over the governm ent
in the next electoral round. Such
strategies and political resources
were em ployed by the Alianza
Popular Revolucionaria Am ericana
(APRA) to challenge Belaunde and
by the left to u n d erm ine Garcia. Al
though the APRA won the 1985
election, the Izquierda U nida (IU)
failed to gain power by using simi
lar tactics in 1990. IU ’s failure was
largely because its strategy of
strikes, stoppages, and blockades
simply wore o u t the patience o f the
electorate.
U nder the Garcia presidency in
the late 1980s, popular disaffection
with both the adm inistration’s
m ethods of governing and APRA’s
stalem ated relation with opposition
parties affected the attitude o f the
electorate. While “turning their
back” on those whom they had
elected could generate a feeling of
treason am ong the voters, the op
position’s activities left the im pres
sion th at social protest, such as
m arches and strikes, was incapable
o f modifying policies adopted from
the “top.” As a result, the ineffec
tiveness o f an exhausted left was
evidenced by the decline in voter
support, from nearly a third in
1975-85 to its extrem ely low cur
re n t level.

RECENT PERUVIAN GOVERNMENTS
Gen. Juan Velasco Alvarado

1968-75

Gen. Francisco Morales Bermudez

1975-80

Fernando Belaunde Terry

1980-85

Alan Garcia Perez

1985-90

Alberto Fujimori

O ne apparent expression of
voter disapproval was the high pro
portion o f citizens who supported
the pursuit o f anticorruption
charges against form er president
Garcia. After the Peruvian suprem e
court ruled in 1991 that the con
gressional accusations were ground
less, a poll found that 60% o f those
surveyed disagreed with the deci
sion, a finding that was virtually
constant across all social classes.
Only 24% o f those surveyed agreed
with the court’s ruling. Effectively
shaping public opinion was the
strong and widely held belief that
Garcia had m isappropriated public
funds and otherwise m ism anaged
the public sector.
The intensification o f citizen
disaffection with both political
parties and individual politicians
seems to have had two principal
beneficiaries. T he first is the Sendero insurgency, which was able to
present itself as a viable opposition
m ovem ent by inflicting m aterial
dam age on both the political au
thorities and those social groups
deem ed responsible for the im ple
m entation o f failed governm ent
econom ic policies. T he “inde

1990-present

pendents,” people who lack pre
vious political experience or links
with traditional political parties,
are also reaping the benefits. Exem
plary o f this p h enom eno n was the
November 1989 election o f televi
sion personality Ricardo Belm ont
as mayor o f Lima. A m uch m ore
significant indication o f this trend
was the 1990 election o f Fujimori
as president.

Short-Term Winner #1:
Sendero Luminoso
A 1991 survey in Lima found that
17% of those polled believed ter
rorist actions were justified. Am ong
the poorest sectors—which com 
prise close to half o f Lim a’s popu
lation— support for terrorism
reached 23%. C om bined with the
state’s crum bling effective pres
ence, such sentim ent forms the
urban foundation upon which the
Sendero insurgency has spread
since 1980. More than a decade
later, the horrible scenario o f Sen
dero terrorism and the “dirty war”
o f governm ent repression has re
sulted in m ore than 25,000 deaths
and m aterial losses that are almost
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the equivalent o f P eru ’s $20 billion
foreign debt.
T he Sendero m ovem ent does
n o t appeal to the majority of Peru
vians. Even so, it has m anaged to
recruit thousands of persons who
believe in the possibility o f rebuild
ing the country’s state and society
along the same lines advocated by
the Khm er Rouge in Cambodia.
T he political im pact o f the Septem 
ber 1992 arrest and conviction of
Sendero fo under Abimael Guzman
is n o t yet clear. In any case, how
ever, it is difficult to im agine the
en d of the subversive m ovem ent in
the n ear future. Indeed, even if the
Sendero m ovem ent itself were to
fall apart, P eru ’s growing poverty,

increasing social polarization, and
progressively ineffective govern
m ent probably ensures that m utant
versions o f the Sendero would take
its place. According to the previ
ously noted 1991 poll in Lima,
while 75% o f those surveyed re
sponded that dem ocracy was their
preferred form of governm ent,
81% o f them said they would sup
p o rt a “governm ent that is not
elected by the people but that is
ju st and improves the situation.”
T he substantial popular support of
both the April 1992 coup and the
subsequent closure of congress fall
into this same category. H ence, the
eventual rise of an alternative sub
versive option—less violent than

APPROVAL/DISAPPROVAL OF GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
___________________

(August 1992)_______________________________

% Approve

% Disapprove

Alberto Fujimori

62

28

Government as a whole

58

28

Economic policy

40

44

Antisubversion strategy

35

53

Opposition

23

65

Cambio 90

46

38

Frente Independiente Moralizador

25

60

Libertad

24

58

Accion Popular

21

65

Partido Popular Cristiano

21

60

FRENATRACA

17

65

Solidaridad y Democracia

16

68

Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana

12

75

Partido Unificado Mariateguista

11

72

Political parties

Source: APOYO S.A. Survey in metropolitan Lima, sample size 500, age 18 and older.
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Sendero and m ore appealing to
the prolonged dissatisfaction o f Pe
ruvians—is a distinct possibility.

Short-Term Winner #2:
Alberto Fujimori
Peruvian voters have experienced
two democratically elected govern
m ents— those o f Belaunde and
Garcia— that restricted political
participation by controlling a rub
ber-stamp congressional majority
while simultaneously displaying
considerable inefficiency in m anag
ing the economy. Against this back
drop, Alberto Fujimori—virtually
unknown on the national political
scene—placed second in the presi
dential prim aries o f 1990, before
ultimately defeating the favorite,
novelist Mario Vargas Llosa, in the
run-off. T he key reasons for Vargas
Llosa’s surprising defeat were his
m em bership in the discredited
“w hite” elite, his bulwark of sup
p o rt within the equally discredited
traditional political parties (Partido
Popular Cristiano and Accion Popu
lar) , and his intention to appoint
m em bers of these parties to posi
tions o f power.
Fujimori, in building his politi
cal future, revealed his unequivocal
rejection o f the traditional role of
political parties in P eru ’s govern
m ent machinery. After his inaugu
ration in July 1990, he provoked a
confrontation with opposition par
ties that controlled both houses of
congress, launching a systematic
campaign o f unfounded accusa
tions against them . For example,
w ithout presenting proof, he ac
cused the parties o f corruption,
especially narcotrafficking. Since
then he has continued this strategy
with the knowledge that a vast sec
tor o f the population rejects the tra
ditional parties and supports his
maneuvers.
T he popularity o f this strategy
is indicated by the fact that, follow
ing the coup o f April 5, 1992—
which closed down the congress
and the courts—public opinion
sided overwhelmingly with a “presi
dential dictatorship” and against a
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regim e in which political parties
exercise power through the legisla
ture. Thus, according to an August
1992 survey in Lima, 62% o f those
polled approved o f Fujimori while
28% disapproved o f him. Fujim ori’s
party, Cambio 90, received only a
46% approval versus a 38% disap
proval rate, b u t no o th er political
party scored m ore than 25%.

New Image, Old Style
Contrary to his cultivated image as
a president d eterm ined to chart a
radically new political course for
Peru, Fujim ori’s governing style is
n o t m uch different from that of
past Peruvian political leadership.
Rem iniscent o f that tradition in
P eru is his highly personal h an 
dling o f the political m ovement,
Cambio 90, that served as his vehi
cle to reach the presidency, his ca
pricious m anipulation o f the rules
d uring the electoral process o f cre
ating a new constituent assembly,
and his intention to change the

Readings and teaching
ideas in English and
Spanish on the conquest
and its legacy
Poetry and prose by Latin A m eri
can and Caribbean authors such
as Claribel Alegria, M anlio
A rgueta, P edro Albizu Cam pos,
Ernesto Cardenal, Ruben Dario,
E duardo Galeano, Nicolas
Guillen, Pablo N eruda, Gabriel
Garcia M arquez, Rigoberta
M enchu, Cesar Vallejo, and more.

constitution mainly to m ake his reelection legally possible. Like his
predecessors, Fujimori eschews in
stitution-building in favor o f free
wheeling m aneuvering, appealing
to the populace for support only
w hen necessary to break political
stalemates with powerful blocs of
elites. Even so, u n d er Fujimori,
Peru is undergoing a basic political
shift: a growing rupture between
the u p p er classes and, on the one
hand, their political parties, and on
the o ther hand, the increasingly
im poverished citizenry. As a conse
quence, electoral outcom es have
becom e m ore erratic and dem o
cratic governance less legitimate
than ever.
T he victors in the November
1992 election for the constituent
assembly were pro-Fujimori “inde
pendents.” These new legislators
are w ithout previous experience in
governm ent and have no record of
com m itm ent to public service. It is
a parliam entary majority that will
do whatever Fujimori requests as

...

long as he enjoys popular support.
If Peru fails to register recovery in
the econom y and social welfare,
however, this fragile coalition is
likely to unravel.
Are there any grounds for opti
mism? A pparently not. O n the one
hand, the Peruvian elite is rejected
by m ost o f the lower social strata;
the arm ed forces are afflicted by
narcotrafFicking, corruption, and
governm ent m anipulation; and the
Catholic C hurch is torn between
conservative and revolutionary
forces. O n the o th er hand, the Pe
ruvian left is in disarray. It is diffi
cult, then, to identify any source
for positive change in Peru. If Peru
does not receive serious infusions
o f external aid to reconstruct its in
stitutions, the country will continue
its free fall into a social, economic,
and political black hole. ■

(Translated by Hemisphere staff)
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Corruption and Democracy
by Carina Perelli

ince the nineteenth cen
tury, accusations o f cor
ruption have been a
recurring excuse for de
posing, or attem pting to
depose, governing au
thorities in Latin America. While
those accusations have been, on
the whole, valid ones, it is almost
inevitable that the subsequent re
gimes are guilty o f the very same
practices. N ot surprisingly, there
fore, Latin Americans tend to re
gard power and corruption as
inextricably intertwined.
Given its constancy, when does
corruption actually rise to the fore
o f public consciousness? W ithin
the framework o f this question, the
details of popular attitudes toward
corruption vary across the coun
tries o f Latin America. For exam 
ple, according to recent surveys,
50% of urban A rgentineans and
Brazilians polled view corruption
as the principal political problem
o f their countries. In Argentina,
however, corruption has been tol
erated politically because the gov
ern m en t appears to be relatively
successful in m anaging the econ
omy, whereas in economically u n 
stable Brazil, it led to one o f the
rare cases in which a president was
indicted and tried for corruption.
In A rgentina, tolerance is in
deed high for the questionable ac
tions and utterances o f ministers,
such as form er labor m inister Luis
Barrionuevo, who once said that
“nobody has ever earned money
working.” C onsider also the state-

Carina Perelli is co-director of the
Sociedad de Analisis Politico, in Mon
tevideo, Uruguay. She has done survey
research in Bolivia, Panama, Para
guay, and Uruguay.

m ent of the highly praised m inister
of econom ics A ntonio Cavallo, who
declared that he requires $10,000
m onthly to live bu t earns only
$2,100 m onthly in his official ca
pacity, receiving the rest in the
form o f payments from a private
foundation. A nother exam ple of
public tolerance is the case of
G erardo Sofovich, who resigned
as a state-appointed m anager o f a

Latin Americans
tend to regard
power and corruption
as inextricably
intertwined. When
does corruption
actually rise to the
fore of public
consciousness?

television station in D ecem ber
1992, following accusations that
he had m ixed his activities as a pri
vate producer with his governm ent
role. Only 55% o f those surveyed in
Buenos Aires condem ned his ac
tions while 37% thought they
should no t have led to his resig
nation. Behind this ambiguity is
the perception that A rgentina has
successfully changed its course,
and that, despite a very high social
cost, the road has been paved to
wards a better future.

In Brazil, on the o th er hand, Fer
nando Collor de Mello—who was
elected president on the grounds
that he would end the flagrant cor
ruption o f public functionaries—
ended his term in January 1993 by
resigning to avoid trial in the sen
ate, which nevertheless im posed
on Collor sanctions identical with
im peachm ent. Still, com paring
Collor’s case with examples of
governm ent corruption in o th er
Latin Am erican countries, C ollor’s
transgressions seem to lack origi
nality. To be sure, the house that
President Collor resided in was
extravagant indeed, bu t this pales
in com parison to the case o f Ar
gentine president Carlos M enem,
who rem odeled his sum m er hom e
on the Atlantic coast, bought a
$60 m illion jet, and is currently
building an expensive third hom e.
A rgentine magazines are filled with
stories about the residences of
M enem ’s relatives and political
associates, reporting that the costs
o f their hom es far exceed their
salaries. In contrast, Cesar Macri,
Collor’s form er labor m inister, was
accused o f taking a $4,000 check—
pocket m oney com pared to A rgen
tina, where few m isdeeds involving
less than a m illion dollars m erit
public accusation.
Com monly in Latin America,
corruption can be covered up or
politically expunged if a function
ary resigns, even if the offenses are
serious. A political m achine acts to
protect itself by complying with
and motivating such maneuvers.
Such action, however, is rarely
enough. In a society like Argen
tina, where television is one o f the
principal shapers o f public opinion
and where prom inent journalists
like B ernardo N eudstadt shout
“paren de robar” (“stop stealing”) , a
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save the nation. Perhaps Collor did
n o t com m it offenses graver than
those o f many o th er politicians and
officials in Latin America. A basic
difference, though, is th at he failed
to build adequate political coali
tions and thus could n o t erase the
footprints o f his actions. P roof of
this point is that an o th er govern
m ent accused o f large-scale cor
ruption, that o f Carlos Andres
Perez in Venezuela, survived as
long as the entire political class
supported Perez in the face o f at
tem pted coups launched by an alli
ance o f military factions and leftist
groups.

What to Do?

Joaquin Lavado “Quino, ”EI Pais (Montevideo, Uruguay), October 18, 1992

potential crisis is at hand if for any
reason confidence is lost in the cur
re n t econom ic program . In that
event A rgentina could face the
same shock wave that is rippling
through Italy today: a profound dis
crediting, n o t only o f politicians
and political parties, but o f the en 
tire political system as well.
In Brazil, governm ent leader
ship sought to clear itself by con
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dem ning Collor. After all, Collor
was an easy target—a “new caudillo” who gained entry to the elite
circles o f decisionm aking without
a political party base and with a
party m achinery whose econom ic
program s proved disastrous. In this
context, the blam e for the coun
try’s profound problem s was simply
cast upon “arribista” individuals like
Collor who failed in their task to

Realistically, Latin Americans can
no t hope to eradicate corruption,
bu t they can curtail it within rea
sonable limits. To do so, however,
all punishable acts m ust be prose
cuted. Indictm ents that are n o t ac
com panied by evidence, and which
fail to lead to convictions, can be
extremely dangerous for the stabil
ity o f political regimes if no such
sanctions are imposed. T he limita
tions on corruption m ust be set by
those who influence public opin
ion and m ust be enforced on the
actions o f the political class.
R ecent events suggest that the
“new caudillos,” such as Collor and
Peruvian president Alberto Fuji
mori, could quickly fall from power
if they do not have the support of
the traditional political m achines
or if they fail to im pose limits on
the trappings o f political office.
Ironically, in the cases o f Vene
zuela and Peru, it seems th at the
violent actions o f extrem ist groups
are provoking a reactive solidarity
am ong otherwise splintered politi
cal elites. This, in turn, may be pro
viding the glue that keeps those
dem ocratic regimes formally intact.
If this is true, then the situation
shouts all the m ore loudly for the
renovation and deepening of
dem ocratic arrangem ents. ■

(Translated by Hemisphere staff)

Venezuelan Alternatives
byJennifer McCoy

fter m ore than three dec
ades o f being a “m odel”
Latin Am erican dem oc
racy, why is Venezuela
Accion Democratica (AD)
now suffering a crisis
o f political legitimacy?
Venezuelans have experienced
crises before— attem pted military
Comite de Organizacion Polftica
coups, intense guerrilla warfare,
Electoral Independiente (COPEI)
party turm oil, and wildly fluctuating
oil prices. Yet these crises were over
Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS)
come, and in some cases they ac
tually strengthened V enezuela’s
approach to democracy. How, then,
Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo (MEP)
do we explain the paradox that a
Causa R
country with one o f the world’s
highest econom ic growth rates in
1991 was undergoing serious politi
cal and social upheaval in 1992?
In 1992 Venezuelans were suf
fering from m ore than the Latin
Am erican im pact o f econom ic scar
Arguably, the V enezuelan crisis
city, including cynicism toward the
reflects broader Latin Am erican
political class. In addition, they
trends. Prim e am ong these is the
were questioning the very direction
difficulty o f gaining support for
in which the country may, and
short-term econom ic sacrifices in
should, be heading. These prob
exchange for long-term improve
lems can be seen no t only in the
m ent, particularly w ithout strategies
resistance o f vested interests to
of com m unication o r alliancechanges in th eir accustom ed eco
building to win that support. Over
nom ic and political privileges, but
looking these two strategies is com 
also in the p opular tendency to
m on to governm ents undergoing
blam e scapegoats for the country’s
econom ic liberalization, which
ills and to look for saviors to ease
tend simply to im pose policies of
the burdens o f econom ic scarcity.
austerity and adjustm ent on their
Does the V enezuelan crisis re
citizenry.
flect unique national conditions?
The Venezuelan case illustrates
O r does it reflect patterns com m on
som ething else as well: the role of
to Latin Am erican countries u n d er
norm ative legitimacy in sustaining
going similar processes of eco
a dem ocratic regim e, even when
nom ic and political liberalization?
the governm ent in power is u n 
popular or discredited. So far, at
least, Venezuelan public opinion
still appears to favor a dem ocratic
Jennifer McCoy is associate professor of
polity to an authoritarian alterna
political science at Georgia State Univer
tive. This view seems to likewise be
sity. She is co-editor o/'Democracy un
true in o th er Latin Am erican coun
d er Pressure: Politics and Markets
tries, such as Brazil, where disen
in Venezuela (Caracas: Nueva Sochantm ent with the F ernando
ciedad, forthcoming).

A

Venezuelan Political Parties
One of the two traditional parties and
the current governing party; social
democratic ideology.
One of the two traditional parties;
Christian democratic ideology.
Split from Communist Party in 1968;
moderate leftist ideology.
Split from AD in 1968; leftist ideology.
Rising leftist party, which began as
a workers’ party in the 1970s; won
governorship of Bolivar state and
mayorship of Caracas in the 1992
elections.

Collor de Mello governm ent had
becom e widespread.
As has occurred in o th er Latin
Am erican countries, Venezuelans
have m ade political leaders scape
goats for their country’s problem s.
Intriguingly, the popular percep
tion o f corruption in Venezuela
seems to be higher now than in
the 1970s, when real corruption was
at its peak. Related to the issue o f
political scapegoating is a tendency
to em brace a “savior”—w hether it
be rising oil prices for Venezuela,
M ercosur for Uruguay, or a charis
matic leader in general—rather
than face the need to adapt to
current realities. In nascent form,
these tendencies are reflected in
the widespread support am ong the
poor and the increasingly im pover
ished m iddle classes in Venezuela
for the anticorruption and anti
politician message o f antiestablish
m ent personalities such as coup
leader H ugo Chaves. These pat
terns are widespread across Latin
America as the region strives to
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adjust to a changing international
economy, revise social policies, and
restore confidence in political insti
tutions so badly dam aged by cen
tralization, presidentialism , and
m ism anagem ent.
Venezuela exhibits many o f to
day’s general problem s o f im ple
m enting econom ic reform . These
problem s are not, however, the pri
mary sources o f its cu rren t political
crisis. Instead, the roots o f the cri
sis lie in V enezuela’s particular
solutions to general dilem mas of
democracy: an overemphasis on
governability, illustrated by tight
party discipline and control, at
the expense o f representation and
participation; satisfying dem ands
through oil revenues rath er than
dom estic taxation; and decision
m aking by an exclusive circle of
elite groups. Finally, the V enezue
lan crisis reflects the larger limits of
a m odel o f capitalist democracy
th at has proved unable to both pro
m ote the m arket and protect the
populace from its negative conse
quences. What, then, are the pros
pects for Venezuelan democracy?
T hree scenarios are possible.

The Optimistic Scenario
T he first scenario is an optimistic
one. In this scenario, pressures
from below lead political parties
and governing officials to intro
duce m ore decentralized and par
ticipatory arrangem ents. A revised
social contract between state and
society would minimize citizen
expectations o f what the state can
provide. A m ore consultative proc
ess o f m aking decisions would in
corporate a wider array o f social
and econom ic interests in the mak
ing o f policy and would open de
bate over developm ent strategy to
address n o t only econom ic growth
bu t social needs as well.
W hat are the prospects for such
a self-generating renewal? Some
positive signs are recent electoral
reform s allowing for direct elec
tions o f governors, mayors, and
m unicipal councils and for single
m em ber district representation for
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50% o f the m unicipal council and
national legislative seats. These re
forms represent a significant step
toward decentralized governance
and the direct accountability of
elected leaders to voters. Already
the im pact o f these changes can be
seen in the increased popularity o f
local leaders over national ones.
T he D ecem ber 1992 reelection
and expansion o f opposition par
ties, at the cost o f the ruling Accion
Dem ocratica (AD) party, as well as
the surprising victory o f the Causa
R candidate in the Caracas mayoral

econom y and want to work hard er
to achieve it. Further, the ambiva
lence o f public opinion about the
econom ic role o f the public and
private sectors opens up the possi
bility o f reduced expectations
about the state’s role in economy
and society.
This optimistic scenario will n o t
com e true, however, unless Vene
zuelans overcome some m ajor
obstacles. It will require the incor
poration o f new interests in the
governing process, new modes
o f political negotiation and com 
prom ise, and new ideas on eco
nom ic productivity. And it will
require political leadership willing
to emphasize the long-term , gen
eral interests o f Venezuelans rath er
than the short-term, electoral inter
ests o f particular parties and indi
viduals.

The roots of
Venezuela’s crisis
lie in its particular
solutions to general
dilemmas of
democracy, including
overemphasis on
governability, oil
revenue, and elite
decisionmaking.

race, indicate the potential for
healthy m ultiparty elections, at
least at the local and regional lev
els. The 1992 electoral successes of
n o t only the Com ite de O rgani
zation Politica Electoral Independiente (COPEI), the m ajor
opposition party, bu t also Causa R,
Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS),
and M ovimiento Electoral del
Pueblo reflect this potential. The
dom inance o f the two traditional
parties at the national level will be
tested in the legislative and presi
dential elections o f D ecem ber 1995.
O th er evidence in support of
the optimistic scenario includes
opinion polls showing th at Vene
zuelans want a m ore productive

The Survival Scenario

|

T he second scenario is the “m ud
dling th ro u g h ” or survival scenario.
In this scenario, dem ocratic poli
tics will survive in Venezuela but
will neither solve n o r exacerbate
pressing national problem s. A first
variant o f this scenario involves the
retaining o f power by traditional
parties through “el tomo” and the
bipartisan electoral m odel o f the
past. T he current econom ic policy
would be m aintained, b u t with
some concessions to the dem ands
of particular interest groups. Infla
tion and deficits would rise, though
no t to insupportable levels. Grad
ual change would be possible
through m odest political and eco
nom ic reform s, yet would be slow
in com ing due to the resistance of
entrenched political and econom ic
interests. A second variant involves
an ind ep en d en t candidate winning
the 1993 presidential election,
while incorporating the traditional
parties into the new governm ent
and m aintaining the broad lines of
current econom ic reforms.
This scenario requires, however,
continued popular support for
dem ocratic politics and congressional support for tax reform and

electoral and political party re
form. W hether the first or second
variant o f the m uddling-through
scenario comes to pass will depend
in large part on the populace’s loy
alty to the traditional parties and
the depths o f its general alienation
from politics. A lthough this cannot
be predicted before the D ecem ber
1993 elections, the D ecem ber 1992
elections give some indications.
T he tu rn o u t rate, though low,
showed some im provem ent over
the high abstention rates o f 1989,
with 55% voting in Caracas (com
pared to only 30% in 1989) and
54% voting nationwide (com pared
to 46% in 1989). Still, this relatively
low tu rn o u t rate reflects continued
voter alienation and was a particu
lar blow to President Carlos Andres
Perez, who had called for voters to
turn o u t to defend the dem ocratic
regim e and to repudiate the coup
attem pt o f November 27, 1992.
In addition, the victories o f the
opposition parties beyond COPEI
indicate voter attraction to alterna
tives to the traditional bipartisan
m odel o f AD-COPEI.

The inertia variant could pro
duce a populist o r demagogic
candidate who wins wide popular
support, but who fails to gain legis
lative support and resorts to auto
cratic rule. Alternatively, a social
explosion in response to econom ic
hardship could lead to the direct
intervention o f the military to pre
serve social order. E ither way, the
pessimistic scenario implies that
Venezuela has n o t reached the
depths o f its potential crisis, and
that the motivation for substantial
positive change will occur only
after those depths have been
reached. Although the violence
o f the second coup attem pt of
1992 may have brought wider re
pudiation and fear of a military al
ternative, the deep disillusionm ent

with the current political leader
ship and practices remains. As a
result, there rem ains the possibility
that nondem ocratic alternatives
will be sought by various social
sectors.
In the final analysis, the pros
pects for Venezuelan democracy
depend on several factors:
■ the ability o f Venezuelan citizens
to resist appealing to a “savior” to
lift their country o u t o f its cur
re n t situation;
• the willingness o f political and
econom ic elites to sacrifice their
own short-term interests for the
national, long-term good; and
• the reevaluation o f the relevance
of past solutions for the dem o
cratic dilem mas and choices of
today. ■
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The Pessimistic Scenario

“Links provides the best

T he third scenario is a pessimistic
one in which the political and eco
nom ic crisis deepens and either a
demagogic autocrat is elected or
a military coup succeeds. This sce
nario could be b rought on by in
ertia a n d /o r social explosion. In
term s o f inertia, a continued politi
cal stalem ate prevents the m aking
o f the tough choices required to ad
dress deepening econom ic scarcity,
corruption, and judicial ineffective
ness. Such inertia is likely to lead to
a social explosion, particularly if
the grim econom ic forecasts for
1993 and 1994 com e true. With
continued weak oil prices, a fiscal
deficit o f 7-8% is likely in 1993 u n 
less taxes are increased and spend
ing is cut. This situation points to
the prospects o f higher inflation,
social unrest over higher prices
a n d /o r cuts in subsidies, and de
clining investm ent as uncertainty
rises.
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Cheddi Jagan and Democracy
An Interview by Anthony P. Maingot

Electedfor thefirst time in 1953, CheddiJagan returns to the presidency of
Guyana with his reputation for honesty and dedication to his people intact.
Hefaces many of the same problems, however, not the least of which are
the ethnic cleavages so evident in the 1992 election

ell me whatfirst comes
to mind when asked to
recall your strugglefor
democracy in Guyana.
Well, somebody asked
m e after I won: how do you feel?
I said I d o n ’t feel any different. In
o th er words, we always accepted
the realities o f o ur situation and re
alized th at we had to struggle and
stay at it persistently, patiently. We
have n o t m ade many mistakes as
an opposition party and thus we
were able to repeatedly win elec
tions.
In the context o f the Cold War
and the strategies and tactics o f lib
eration, we can say that we had a
correct approach and th at’s what
sustained us. For example, we
could have taken the route o f El
Salvador, b u t we d id n ’t. We recog
nized the balance o f forces, but
mostly we realized that our elec
toral way was better. T he p ro o f of
this is th at we have obtained power
while discussions for power sharing
are still going on in El Salvador.

Editor’s Note: This interview with
Cheddi Jagan, president of Guyana,
took place in Miami on November 30,
1992.

36
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Recently, Professor Arthur Schlesinger apologizedfor US actions in
1962. How did those actions color
your perceptions of US policy back
then and have those perceptions
changed?
At th at time the missile crisis,
and before that the Bay o f Pigs in
vasion o f Cuba, had clouded all per
spectives on the hem isphere. We
becam e the victims o f that anti
com m unist hysteria. Guyana, it was
thought, was becom ing not only
in d ep en d en t bu t a n o th er Cuba;
even m ore dangerous, because
Cuba, being an island, could be
surrounded and blockaded, no t
Guyana. A lthough I m ade every ef
fort to assuage these perceptions
by going directly to the Latin Amer
ican group at the UN and stating
that if that was the m ajor concern
o f the West, then we were prepared
to sign a treaty, like Austria had,
m aking Guyana a neutral country
guaranteed by UN powers. I even
went beyond that and said that
upon independence the governor
general would be appointed by the
opposition in parliam ent and that
he would have veto powers on ques
tions such as the im portation of
arms or the leasing o f military
bases to foreign countries. Despite
our dem ocratic behavior and prom 
ises o f neutrality, nobody was pre
pared to listen because o f the

existing hysteria. So we becam e
the victims o f indiscrim inate anti
com m unism.
We were, therefore, very glad
that the Nation provided Professor
Schlesinger the opportunity in 1990
to say that he was sorry for what the
Kennedy adm inistration had done
30 years ago (see insert on p. ??).
But I had to rem ark th at the injus
tice was no t done ju st to me, but
m ore seriously to the country and
to the people. T he consequences
were grave for them . W hen I was
head o f the governm ent in the
1960s, Guyana’s socioeconom ic
level was in second place in the
Caribbean. It was bracketed with
“the big fo u r”— Guyana, Trinidad,
Jam aica, and Barbados. Today, 30
years later, Guyana has the lowest
developm ental status o f the whole
hem isphere, even lower than Haiti.
Fatally, half o u r population now re
sides abroad, a massive brain drain
from which we will take years to
recuperate.

As the most recent elections show,
Guyana is quite evidently still po
larized on racial grounds. What
will you do to minimize this situa
tion?
First o f all, let m e make a clarifi
cation. T he analysis o f Guyana’s
politics is sometimes too simplistic.
W hen one says that politics is all

racial, one should no t disregard
the issue o f social class. Especially
in the 28 years since B urnham and
the P eople’s National Congress
(PNC) came to power, a new com
p rad o r bourgeoisie has em erged.
And, therefore, you had, for in
stance, in the PNC regim e n o t a
“black” governm ent ruling in the
interest o f the black people who
are in their majority working class.
R ather, it was at the service o f the
black and Indian elite. T hat is why
during the last cam paign we had
what we called in Guyana, the Com
m ittee for the Re-election o f Hoyte
(CREEP), m ade up o f wealthy In
dians who h ad p lanned to raise
35 million Guyana dollars for the
reelection o f Hoyte and the PNC.
O n the o th er hand, we of the
P eople’s Progressive Party (PPP)
had m ultiracial unity. In the oppo
sition Patriotic Alliance for Democracy/PPP grouping, for instance,
there were five parties. Also in op
position to the PNC were six trade
unions: two in sugar, two in baux
ite, one in the civil service, and an
o th er in the clerical field. These
represented all the races. At the
religious level, there were two bish
ops (one Anglican who was black
and one Catholic who was Indian)
who played a very big role in the
struggle for fair and free elections.

Let me ask you a subsidiary ques
tion regarding race and elections.
When you first came into power
in Guyana in 1953 and then won
again in 1957, the electoral system
used was the traditional British sin
gle-member constituency or “firstpast-the-post” system, which
divided the country into constitu
encies that elected, on a simple
majority basis, only one candidate
each. In this system, there is sel
dom a relationship between the
number of seats won and the over
all vote for a particular party. The
PPP tended to win many more
seats than its overall vote would
warrant proportionately. This led
the US, as Schlesinger points out in

Jagan with Jawaharlal Nehru, Delhi, 1953

Jagan talks to his supporters during a 1961 election victory celebration.

his book, A Thousand Days, to
pressure the British into changing
the system to one ofproportional
representation specifically to deny
you power. What are your thoughts
about the system most suited to
Guyana today?
As you know the PNC ran three
suspect elections in a row with the

proportional representation sys
tem. T hat was the only way to de
feat us. Be that as it may, I would
still say that there are certain advan
tages to that system, ju st like there
are with the first-past-the-post one.
T here are minuses and pluses to
both.
O ur present system of pro p o r
tional representation is too com-
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Schlesinger’s Apology
C ut now to the Nation office 26 years later. O ur guest a n d speaker
at a sem inar for the Nation staff and interns is Cheddi Jagan, three
times popularly elected prim e m inister o f British Guiana p rio r to
its independence in 1964 and today the leader o f G uyana’s largest
political party. Jagan wrote in a book, The West on Trial: The Fight
for Guyana’s Freedom (Seven Seas Books, 1966), in which he
charged but for US intervention, h e an d his party would have
won the Guyanese election o f 1964 and ushered the country into
its new era o f independence (and perhaps, we would add, have
avoided some o f the bloodshed, racial conflict, misery, and chaos
th at came in the wake o f his party’s defeat). As p ro o f o f Kennedy
adm inistration intervention, he cited A Thousand Days, in which
A rthur Schlesinger said h e rep o rted to the president that Jag a n ’s
opponents “would cause us many fewer problem s.”Jagan was
u n d er suspicion because o f his Marxist wife and his leftist politics,
as evidenced by his responses during a “M eet the Press” interview,
and, writes Schlesinger, there was a way to beat him. Jag an ’s parlia
m entary strength was larger than his popular strength: he had
won 57% o f the seats on the basis o f 42.7% o f the vote. An obvi
ous solution would be to establish a system o f proportional repre
sentation, which on Schlesinger’s recom m endation and with the
collusion o f the British, was finally done. Jagan was out.
E nter Professor Archie Singham , m em ber o f the Nation’s edito
rial board, long-time Caribbeanist and activist-scholar. At Singham ’s suggestion, we sent a copy o f relevant passages o f Jag an ’s
book to Schlesinger, suggesting that the Pulitzer Prize w inner jo in
the sem inar. T he Cold W ar m ust indeed be over: Schlesinger,
who has h ad a long bu t uneasy history with the Nation, called to
say he would accept, with great anticipation.
T hose present witnessed a rare thing: a private public apology.
Schlesinger was quick to say, “I felt badly about my role 30 years
ago.” H e conceded that Jagan was right ab o u t US intervention, al
though he said the US was m otivated less by a security concern
ab out a com m unist threat in the hem isphere than by a domestic
political concern. ‘T h e re was a great feeling after the Bay o f Pigs,
where the im pression arose that Eisenhower had prepared an
expedition to get rid o f Castro, th at Kennedy had lacked the reso
lution to follow through it. It was jus! politically going to look very
bad if the dom inoes began to fall in South Am erica___ The fear
was th at Congress m ight use aid to British G uiana as a m eans o f at
tacking the whole aid bill then before it----- T hen o f course what
really h ap p en ed was the CIA got involved, got the b it between
its teeth and the covert action people thought was a chance to
show their stuff.. . . I think a great injustice was done to Cheddi
Jag an .”

Editor’s Note: Excerpted with permission from, an editorial in the Nation,
June 4, 1990.
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plex and confusing, bu t it gives
you an exact reflection o f the real
vote o f the people and how they
should be represented in parlia
m ent. N onetheless, it does have
the deficiency o f encouraging the
creation o f a multiplicity o f parties
based on race, religion, and any
and all kinds o f nonsense.
First-past-the-post is n o t as dem o
cratic in representation, b u t it is
m ore efficient and stable in terms
o f presenting and representing con
stituency views and interests. It ob
viously favors the larger parties,
which m eans that small parties on
the left could never get represen
tation in parliam ent.
So, what are we going to do?
We had proposed in 1961 and 1962,
in a conference in London, th at
the best system for Guyana was the
m ixed system such as those o f Ger
many and Suriname.

Absolutely. That’s what the Consti
tutional Reform Commission of
Trinidad recommended in 1974.
This is o f interest to us because
we are going to set up m echanisms
similar to a constitution reform
commission to look at the whole
constitution, including the elec
toral system.

How do youfeel today about the
follozmng: (a) the decline of the
socialist bloc and the global push
towards free enterprise and com
petition between open economies;
and (b) the emphasis on privatiza
tion?
I have always said that social
ism d id n ’t com e from the skies. It
came into being as a system largely
because o f the misery th at the capi
talist system in England and else
where brought about. Marx and
Engels’s thesis contains certain ide
als that are m ore o r less the same
as the ideals o f the early Utopians
and even the early Christians. I
would say that those ideals are still
valid. O ne sees that in the way relig
ions constantly speak o f protecting
the poor. For instance, the Pope

recently talked about the evils o f an
unethical capitalism that m arginal
izes large segm ents o f the popula
tion.

You are saying, then, that those
ideals are not the exclusive domain
of socialism?
T h at’s right.

How about the competition be
tween open economies, a new
dogma that some are calling neo
liberalism, but which, of course,
has very deep roots in capitalist
thought?
In the case o f Guyana, it is true
that we had, in general, a similar
ideological, philosophical outlook
as the Eastern E uropean countries
and the form er Soviet U nion, but
o u r practice was different. They
em phasized econom ic, social, and
cultural rights, b u t they were short
on hum an civil and political rights.
We, in Guyana, despite all the prob
lems we faced and now face, intend
to em phasize all these rights. So I
would say h ad the West not moved
in to destabilize the PPP govern
m ent in Guyana, today we would
have what is called “socialism with
a hum an face.” This to us m eans
efficient m anagem ent, fair wages,
good governance, and democracy.
PPP adm inistrations dem onstrated
this capacity very clearly.
T he p oint is th at sometimes you
may need privatization and this can
take different forms. So, I take an
inflexible position as to w hether it
is right or wrong but look at the
issues, case by case and in relation
to the entire developm ent process.
By the way, people now say Guyana
has o ne of the m ost open econo
mies am ong CARICOM nations.
Isn’t this paradoxical?

One of the most intractable prob
lems confronting world leaders is
the tension between sovereignty
(including the Doctrine of NonIntervention) and cases of appall
ing human rights abuses in certain

states. How do you feel about hu
manitarian interventions generally
and in this hemisphere specifically?
O ne has to be very careful about
intervention u n d er any rubric.
T here m ight be cases, for instance,
where one m ight be intervening in
the nam e o f hum an rights, bu t the
real motivations m ight be differ
ent. And, yet, one cannot ignore
the UN Convention on H um an
Rights. We, in Guyana, certainly
subscribe to it. T here ought to be
a growing realization am ong state
leaders that if they violate rights,
any rights, w hether they be civil, po
litical, economic, social, or cultural,
they are going to have troubles.
R em em ber G orbachev’s famous
statem ent that what obstructed the
Soviet economy—hindered eco
nom ic and productive forces—was
the bureaucratic com m and type of
governm ent and adm inistration.
T h at’s why we, in Guyana, are insist

Peru
under Fire
H uman Rights since the
Return to Democracy
Americas W atch
“A gripping and com pre
hensive sum m ary o f th at
co u n try’s m ultiple crises.
...A detailed analysis of
how dem ocracy fails in
its fundam ental duty to
p rotect the hum an rights
o f Peruvian citizens and
how U.S. governm ent
policy m ay well exacer
bate rather than alleviate
this failure.”— David
Scott Palm er
$23.50
A jo in t
publication
o f Yale
University
Press and
H um an

ing that you m ust have democracy
at all levels (central, local, m unici
pal, district, and even in the work
place in term s o f worker partici
pation) .

But let’s take the case of Somalia,
for instance, which is heading to
wards a massive military interven
tion. How would Guyana vote in
cases like that?
T h at’s a very serious situation
there because millions are dying
from h unger . . . and people are
willing to give assistance. It is n o t
up to individual countries, b u t to
the UN to deal with such cases.
If there is to be any kind o f inter
vention, it m ust be through the
UN, no t a case where some coun
tries move in and then ask the UN
to baptize it. I have always believed
that there has to be the rule o f law,
international law governing state
behavior. ■

The
Rich Neighbor
Policy

Sugarbali

Rockefeller and Kaiser
in Brazil

Alan M. Klein

The American Game,
the Dominican Dream

This fascinating book
evokes the wild enth usi
asm th at D om inicans
have for the game and
shows how it m irrors the
conflict they feel between
allowing and resisting
A m erican hegem ony in
their country.

Elizabeth A. Cobbs
“The book spells o u t in
greater detail than any
o th er study the complex
relationship between
public and private
sectors in the operations
o f U.S. capitalism in
Latin A m erica after
W orld W ar II. It should
prove useful in the
continuing debate over
dependency, the nature
o f the developm ent
process, and the role o f
private investm ent—
dom estic and foreign—
in stim ulating econom ic
grow th.”— Joseph S.
Tulchin Illus. $30.00

“Sugarbali pleases because
o f its thoughtful,
progressive political
readings o f baseball’s
force in a society.”
•— Eric Solom on, San
Francisco Review o f Books
Illus. $14.00

Yale
University
Press

W in n er o f the A llan N evins Prize given
by the Society o f A m erican H istorians

92A Yale Station,
New H aven, CT 06520
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Guyana ’92: It’s About Time
by Gary BranaShute

w ouldn’t be the first to say that
the C aribbean is in a constant
process o f redefinition. W hen
I went to Guyana in 1983,
Forbes B urnham was president,
my friends addressed m e as
com rade, the Pegasus H otel was a
watering hole for C uban and N orth
Koreans, and I dined on chicken
and cheese sandwiches washed
down with a soapy-tasting rice-brew
called Banks beer.
W hen I retu rn ed to the Pegasus
in 1992 to observe the elections as
a m em ber o f the Council o f Freely
Elected Heads o f G overnm ent led
by form er US president Jimmy
Carter, everything had changed,
including the nam e o f the hotel.
At the European-owned Forte Crest
nee Pegasus, I was greeted by an
English m anager and serenaded
by the Platters over the restaurant
speakers while I ate a d in n er of
pork m edallions accom panied by
im ported beer. T he bill was less
than US $10. Later that night I
adjourned to the Palm G arden
nightclub on Main Street to find
G eorgetow n’s nouveau yuppie class
spending their privatization dollars
and schem ing to cash in on divest
m ent, the boom ing gold conces
sions, the collapse o f the parallel
exchange rate (US $1=G $134),
foreign investm ent, and the widely
conceded fall o f the P eople’s Na
tional Congress (PNC). O n dis
covering th at I was on the C arter
team, an Indo-Guyanese patron
greeted me by saying, “Boy, are we
glad to see you h ere.” Not every
body was.

I

Gary Brana-Shute is an anthropologist
at the US Department of State’s Foreign
Service Institute.
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It is im portant to keep in m ind
that in the 28 years o f extraordi
nary corruption preceding the
m ost recent election, a loss at the
polls led automatically to charges
o f electoral fraud. T he slightest pro
cedural mistake or oversight, h o n 
est or not, was taken by the parties
participating as clear and com pel
ling evidence th at chicanery was
afoot. As for the voters, they wanted
absolute perfection and would take
any departure from that as proof
o f massive vote-rigging. N ot sur
prisingly, Georgetown was in a

dour m ood in the days prior to
the election.
Eleven parties would contest the
general election, although only
four—the P eople’s Progressive
Party (PPP)/Civic, the PNC, the
W orking P eople’s Alliance (WPA),
and the U nited Force (TUF)—
stood a chance o f capturing votes
from the 395,000 voters who would
be casting ballots in Guyana’s 10
districts.
Certain areas were locked up
from the start; the solidly IndoGuyanese C orentyne was PPP; and

the Afro-Guyanese dom inated
bauxite areas o f L inden and Kwakwani were in the PNC bag, as were
such Georgetown neighborhoods
as Plaisance, Tiger Bay, and Albouystown. T he m ixed urban m id
dle class and Am er-Indians in the
R upununi would go over to TUF,
reflecting the influence o f white
cattle herders and Jesuit mission
aries (who saw themselves as a
bulwark against “socialism” and
“com m unism ”). Up for grabs and
m ost likely to see violence were the
hotly contested and racially mixed
Georgetown neighborhoods of
Charlestown, South Ruimveld,
South Penitence, Queenstown,
and Charity—as well as the coastal
towns o f New Am sterdam, Berbice,
Essequibo, and West Dem erara.
In sum, 60% o f the eligible voters
lived within 45 m inutes o f the po
litical ground zero at Georgetown.

Under Cheddi
a day’s pay could buy
LB CHICKEN
LBS FLOUR
GL RICE
LB SUGAR
LB SALT
1/2 PT PEAS
1 LB GARLIC
1 PT COOKING OIL
1 LB MARGARINE
1 GL KERO
1 CK SOAP

As the rank and file engaged in riot
ing during and after election day,
party leaders exacerbated tensions
by refusing to declare w hether or
n o t they would accept electoral
results—even if they were certified
as open and fair.
Suspicion becam e rife when it
was rum ored that the South Flor
ida firm contracted to print the
ballots had printed an excess of
90,000 over the num ber o f regis
tered voters. Worse, the logo o f the
East Indian dom inated coalition,
PPP/Civic, appeared on the ballot
only as PPP. R ancorous debate fol
lowed as to w hether this was a PNC
plot to portray the PPP/Civic as a
single ethnic group party and thus
to u n d ercut its appeal across ethnic
lines. Party leaders Cheddi Jagan
and Samuel Hinds decided at the
last m inute to let the logo stand as
it was, concluding that any protest

A brand new car w as $4000.00
brand new m otor cycle w as $400.00
A brand new bicycle. $110.00
Rent w as $4.00
Lightbill w as $1.00
Dem w as good days
W hen w e dollar w as a real dollar

would give the ruling PNC a pre
text to fatally postpone the elec
tions.
More ominously, the “disci
plined forces” (about 6,000 sol
diers, police, militia, and prison
guards) were allowed to vote a
week before the national election
so that they could be available on
election day to control violence.
Violence, however, was very nearly
touched off by the process, as a lo
gistical logjam at the one polling
station caused long lines o f frus
trated officers to wait until almost
m idnight to vote. Tem pers flared
and m ore than 300 o f those offi
cers never m ade it into the voting
booth. They were later given dis
pensation to vote with the public
on general election day, b u t the
widely asked question was inevita
ble. Was this a PNC plot to sow
fear, arrange an o th er postpone-

7 Years under
PRESIDENT HOYTE

a day’s pay can’t even
buy one gallon rice.
New car costs G$3. M.
New motor bike - $150,000.
New bicycle - $6,000.
UMPTEEN devaluations
G $1.00 less than US1*
Foreign debt US2.1 Billion
NO ROOM TO RENT

J U D G E for yourself, w ho is the better m anager?
T he po w er to S T O P the destruction is in your hands.
R ight the w ro n g do ne to this man.

VOTE PPP/CIVIC
PAID ADVERTISEM ENT
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m en t pretext, o r rig the ballot?
While the answer rem ains unclear,
the event did n o t affect the results
significantly.
D oubt was also raised about the
neutrality o f the Elections Commis
sion officials—dubbed presiding
officers—who would m onitor the
polling places as agents o f the gov
ern m e n t along with representatives
o f each political party. Rank-andfile presiding officers, appointed to
those positions during the last two
decades o f PNC power, were widely
suspected o f being PNC cat’s paws.
T o am eliorate the fear o f presiding
officers rigging the election, Rudy
Collins, the Elections Commission
chair, prom ised that for every “old
tim er” there would be a “new” pre
siding officer appointed to serve at
his side. Further, should there be
allegations o f presiding officers
prohibiting persons from voting
or simply n o t showing up to open
the polls, a special “rapid deploy
m en t force” o f nonpartisan officers
would be at the ready to drive o r fly
to any affected polling station.
T he neutral Stabroek News and
the PPP-aligned Mirror were crank
ing at full speed, encouraging the
public to hang tough. After 20
years the latter p aper had been al
lowed to im port a new press and
printing materials, although I use
the term “new” very loosely, having
seen better presses at work printing
college newsletters. Pre-election es
timates o f 30,000 people without
national identification cards raised
the nightm are o f disenfranchise
m ent, despite a voter’s presence on
the registration list. Mechanisms
were p u t in place to allow anyone
on the list with any sort o f identifi
cation (driver license, passport,
m edical insurance card) to vote.
For those lacking even that, a
sworn oath (on a Bible, Koran, or
the constitution o f Guyana) that
they were the person on the list,
coupled with the personal identifi
cation o f two o th er voters, would
suffice.
Stories o f governm ent drivers
abandoning ballot boxes on their
way to delivering them to polling
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sites were ram pant. T hen there was
the perennial story about the ink
sm eared on the fingers to indicate
com pleted voting; it could be easily
wiped off with bleach, the rum or
went, thus perm itting m ultiple vot
ing. Despite this particular, o r per
haps because o f it, Guyanese voters
had enough ink on their fingers to
transcribe Shakespeare for a week.
G eneral calm prevailed, however,
as everyone knew the outside world
was watching. No less an illustrious
cast than Jim my Carter, Belize
prim e m inister George Price, and
the US, British, and C anadian em 
bassies m ade it clear that Guyana’s
future was riding on a straight-up
contest.

Stories of government
drivers abandoning
ballot boxes on their
way to polling sites
were rampant, as
werefears of multiple
voting.

Election Day
I was posted in the town o f Lethem
on Guyana’s b o rd er with Brazil.
Lethem is a PNC-dom inated gov
ern m en t outpost surrounded
by settlem ents o f Macushi and
W apishiana Am erindians. It can
only be reached by land rover over
hardscrabble laterite roads. My
four polling stations in this rugged
town totaled about 1,000 voters.
O ur roles as m em bers o f the Car
ter team were many. Prim e am ong
them was the vital function o f pro
viding a “quick-count” sample. O ne
o f those m aking this initial count,
R obert Pastor, executive secretary
of the Council o f Freely Elected
Heads o f G overnm ent, described
the process: “. . . despite the dan
ger and uncertainty, at 6:00 p.m.

as the voting ended, o u r entire
delegation w ent to polling sites in
every region o f the country to con
duct the ‘quick-count.’ By 2:00 a.m.
the Elections Commission had com 
piled less than 1% o f the vote, but
the quick-count had received a
scientific sample o f about 12% of
the vote, which showed th at the
PPP/Civic had clearly won. Be
cause of reports o f stolen o r lost
ballot boxes and the Election Com
m ission’s slow com pilation o f the
results, there were fears the elec
tion could be stolen in the count.
T he fact that President C arter
knew the results and had com 
m unicated them in confidence to
President [H ugh D esm ond] Hoyte
and Mr. Jagan provided a base-line
from which to m easure the actual
count. . . . If the final results were
at variance from the quick-count,
there would be presum ption of
fraud. T he quick-count provided
an elem ent o f stability on the cru
cial issue o f the count. In fact, the
official results o f the election fell
within the m argin o f erro r o f the
quick-count sample. T he delega
tion visited two-thirds o f the voting
sites throughout Guyana during
the day, filling in detailed ob
servation forms based on fears
expressed by the parties o f what
could go wrong on election day.
. . . Conditions at all bu t 2% o f the
sites visited were found to be satis
factory.”
For me, the day’s activities be
gan a bit earlier—at 4:00 a.m. I ob
served the delivery o f ballot boxes,
witnessed the counting o f empty
ballots, exam ined the boxes to see
that they were empty and properly
locked, and m et representatives
from the political parties. T here
was no electricity, and the opening
and closing o f the station were
done by lantern.
By 6:00 a.m. voters, mostly Amer
indians, began to line up. Allowing
for individual cases, it averaged
about 10 m inutes for each person
to identify h im /h e rse lf and vote.
Most would do so successfully and
place a cross or tick adjacent to
their party symbol— a cup, palm

tree, rising sun, cow, rooster, etc.
Instructions were provided in Eng
lish and Macushi, and, in several
cases, Portuguese, as the Macushi
pay little attention to international
borders and generally have family
in bo th Guyana and Brazil. T he
polls closed at 6:00 p.m. and the
counting began. I took my two
“quick-count” samples and radioed
them to Georgetown via a short
wave transm itter at a Jesuit mission
station.
N orth A m erican and European
observers criticized the voting proc
ess as “inefficient” and “slow. ” I can
only reply with bem used w onder at
that conclusion. Many o f the voters
I talked to walked five hours to the
polling station, stood in line in the
h o t sun for several m ore, and spent
five hours after th at retu rn in g to
their residences on foot. T he time
standards o f the industrialized
West do n o t apply in the hinter
lands o f Guyana.
T he tabulations at day’s end
were one with great attention to
cerem onial detail, allowing each
poll w atcher to exam ine the
m arked ballot at the polling station
count. T he elections in Lethem
p roceeded m ore slowly than they
would have in suburban Grosse
Point, b u t they were as clean as a
sterilized test tube. T he townspeo
ple o f L ethem voted PNC, while
the Macushi split their ballots be
tween the WPA and TUF. Ineffi
cient, perhaps, b u t proper.
At the same time, propriety was
being roughly han d led back in
Georgetown. All hell broke loose
at the Elections Commission office,
as looters 1,000 strong ram paged
down R egent and Robb Streets.
In addition, the PPP’s Freedom
House headquarters came u n d er
attack. T he police and military
were com pelled to cordon off the
downtown area and stay there on
fully-armed alert for a week.
In a well-orchestrated effort to
derail the elections, PNC support
ers gathered on election-day m orn
ing to declare th at the registration
lists were inaccurate and that they
h ad b een disenfranchised. By early

DECLARATION
Under
THE REPRESENTATION OF THE
PEOPLE ACT
(Chapter 1:03)
GENERAL ELECTIONS
DECLARATION OF RESULTS
In accordance with section 99 of the Representa
tion of the People Act, Chapter 1;03, the Elections
Commission hereby declares that the results of the
General Elections on 5th October, 1992 pursuant to
article 60(2) of the Constitution are as follows
(a)

The number of votes cast for each list of candi
dates is as follows:

PEOPLE’S PROGRESSIVE PARTY/CIVIC 162,058
128,286
PEOPLES NATIONAL CONGRESS
6,068
WORKING PEOPLE’S ALLIANCE
3,183
THE UNITED FORCE
1,557
DEMOCRATIC LABOUR MOVEMENT
1,343
UNITED REPUBLICAN PARTY
298
PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT
134
UNION OF GUYANESE INTERNATIONAL
114
NATIONAL REPUBLICAN PARTY
77
UNITED WORKER’S PARTY
68
NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT
TOTAL NUMBER OF VALID VOTES
(b)

303,186

The number of rejected ballot papers is 5,666

afternoon the situation grew uglier
still as the commission was attacked
with stones and bottles, breaking
all the windows in the building.
T he staff retreated upstairs as the
crowd broke into the com pound
and trashed the bottom floors,
while the US ambassador, cut by
flying glass, m ade off for safety.

T here were cries o f ‘Judas, Ju d as,”
“We want Hoyte,” and ‘Jap an pay
Collins.” Dispersed by the disci
plined forces, the crowd surged
back to the business district for
m ore “smash and grab ”— the Guy
anese euphem ism for looting—at
the m ajor departm ent stores, in
cluding the newly opened K-mart.
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A m ateur pundits suggested that
legitim ate frustration, plus the
fears o f PNC supporters that their
party was going under, was being
wickedly m anipulated by PNC
thugs. T he looting, however, was
largely a m atter o f personal enrich
m en t in a situation o f chaos. If
there was a time during the elec
tion when the military could have
stepped in and im posed martial
law, it was then. Perhaps they
would have, h ad no t form er US
president Carter, at great personal
risk, gone to the Elections Commis
sion to stand shoulder-to-shoulder
with the Guyanese staff. H e person
ally called Brigadier Joseph Singh
o f the military and Police Commis
sioner Laurie Lewis to inform them
th at they were com pelled to pro
tect an ex-president and in so do
ing had to protect the Elections
Commission and the ballot tabulat
ing equipm ent. It was a close call,
b u t the violence that occurred the
following day was nipped in the
bud by security forces.
O n Tuesday night Georgetown
had the som ber stillness o f the
calm before the storm. As I toured
the city with two journalists, we
were told to stay away from Stabroek m arket, where an angry
crowd was gathering. Two young
m en, an Afro-Guyanese and an
Indo-Guyanese, rode by on bicycles,
both sporting huge bread knives in
th eir waistbands. They w arned us
to stay off the street as “bad peo
p le”—who would not accept the
elections—were gathering and that
they—m ixed pals—were the future
o f Guyana. Senator Ryan Peralto,
an observer from the Jam aican
L abour Party, asked a young Afro
taxi driver if Afro-Guyanese would
accept a Jagan governm ent. His an
swer: “Forget the Afro bullshit, we
n eed an elected governm ent.”
T hen, in eloquent Guyanese Eng
lish, he po in ted out the virtues o f
the checks and balances o f Westminster-style parliam entary de
mocracy. By W ednesday m orning
G eorgetown was quiet, with only
an occasional lackluster cry of
“We want Hoyte.” At a cocktail re
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ception that night an African ob
server on the Com m onw ealth team
cornered a lam e duck PNC minis
ter and coyly asked, “You know,
many people seem ed frightened
o f the defense forces. Why do you
think that is?” T he m inister smiled
weakly and replied that a new con
sensus was em erging. Any knots
o f people left on the streets at this
p oint were only those stranded
by lack o f transportation.

Perhaps the
military would
have intervened,
had notJimmy Carter
gone to the Elections
Commission in support
of the Guyanese staff.

The Aftermath
O n W ednesday evening President
Hoyte spoke on national radio and
conceded the presidential election.
H e appealed for order and peace
and prom ised a legal transfer of
power. A lthough n o t all the votes
were tabulated, it was clear that the
uncounted rem ainder would not
com pensate for Jag a n ’s lead. The
presidential contest, however, was
only half the battle. It would have
to wait until all the votes were
counted before the distribution
o f parliam entary seats could be an
nounced. For president, the candi
date with the majority o f votes wins
the office. T hat w inner was clear
early on. T he 65 seats in parlia
m ent are an o th er m atter, thanks to
Guyana’s tricky system o f p ropor
tional representation at the na
tional and regional levels.
O f the 65 m em bers o f the Na
tional Assembly, 55 are elected in
accordance with the proportions
each party receives in the presiden
tial election. Jag a n ’s 52% netted

the PPP/Civic 28 seats; H oyte’s
44% netted the PNC 23 seats. The
WPA with 2% captured one seat
and the TU F’s 1% allowed them to
squeak in with one. T en o f the as
sembly seats are elected by the 10
Regional Dem ocratic Councils;
one seat for each o f the 10 districts,
with the council m em bership be
ing voted on at the same time as
the president. Finally, two seats are
elected by a national m eeting o f
the National Council o f Local
Dem ocratic Councils. T he final
totals were PPP/Civic 35, PNC 27,
WPA 2, and TUF 1. Although not
formally in coalition, the P P P /
Civic, WPA, and TUF are collabo
rating. PPP/Civic also worked deals
with WPA region eight and TUF in
region nine to bolster the three par
ties’ acquisition o f regional seats
and thereby enlarge their rep re
sentation in parliam ent.
T here will be rum blings from
such PNC types as form er prim e
m inister H am ilton G reene and
form er director o f propaganda
and m obilization R obert Corbin
issuing threats and bom bast from
time to time. Hoyte, however, will
probably endeavor to secure his
place in Guyanese history by be
com ing the grandfatherly and re
sponsible leader o f the PNC. It
seems likely that he will pursue
rebuilding the party in an equally
responsible fashion. After all, the
PNC did no t lose by th at much.
Hoyte can also salve the wound
o f loss by heeding the exam ple of
two CARICOM political figures:
Jam aica’s Edward Seaga and Trini
dad and Tobago’s Patrick M anning.
Both lost elections and offered
their assistance in the transition
o f power. Both survived the experi
ence to retu rn to power, M anning
having achieved the goal in a simi
larly m ultiethnic state.
T he newly self-confident Guy
anese people do no t want to see a
retu rn to the dark and destructive
days o f Burnham ism . T he outside
world is watching and my guess is
that the dem ocratic process is ir
reversible in Guyana. It’s about
time. ■
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The Theater of Cuban Politics
by Damian Fernandez

Castro’s Final H our: T he Secret
Story Behind the Coming Down
fall of Com m unist Cuba
by Andres Oppenheimer. Simon and
Schuster Publishers, 1992. 461 pp.
$25.00.

Cuban Politics: The Revolution
ary E xperim ent
by Rhoda Rabkin. Praeger Publishers,
1991. 235 pp. $39.95.
eatro, puro teatro," the
late C uban songstress
Hj
La Lupe (a.k.a. La Yiyiyi)
belted in one o f h er signaHj
ture songs. A lthough she
Mi
was expressing the theatri
cality o f duplicitous love, as she
p ranced on the stage, tearing off
h e r clothes, slapping h er pianist,
and scream ing at the audience, h er
lyrics could ju st as well have re
ferred to the arena o f politics. Poli
tics is theater, if no t show business.
Like dram a, politics has a text and
a subtext, a stage and a backstage.
As in the plays o f Bertolt Brecht,
the actors and the audience in
teract. A nd as w hen we e n ter a
playhouse, politics requires us to
believe in the possibility o f a dif
feren t world. T he tension between
the governed and the governing is
the dram atic heart o f politics. The
plot unfolds as the conflicts be
tween the two em erge.
Like La Lupe, Cuban politics
have always been theatrical; in fact,

Jjj

Damian Fernandez is associate pro
fessor of international relations and
director of the Graduate Program in
International Studies at Florida Inter
national University. He is the editor of
C uban Studies since the Revolu
tion (University Press of Florida, 1992).
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they reached operatic dim ensions
after Fidel C astro’s revolutionary
ascent to power in 1959. The genre
o f the perform ance differs accord
ing to the viewer and the reviewer.
For some it is epic, for others tragic
or comic, and for yet others it is
theater o f the absurd. Scholars and
journalists have differed in their re
views o f the Cuban production.

Cuban politics have
always been theatrical;
in fact, they reached
operatic dimensions
after Fidel Castro’s
revolutionary ascent
to power in 1959.
The genre of the
| performance differs
according to the
viewer and the
reviewer.

T he difference between how
journalists and scholars approach a
topic is, at its m ost basic level, one
o f language. It is also, however,
one o f time and space: journalists
capture a scene, while scholars at
tem pt to cover the entire three-act
play. A nother difference is that of
audience. A journalist’s words are
read by many; a scholar’s, typically,
by few. Journalists are usually at
their best when they focus on di
m ensions o f life that scholars

seldom address. Journalists can
provide entertainm en t and enlight
en m en t at the same time; scholars
are socialized to be serious, as if
seriousness were a virtue. Yet,
given their distinctly different ap
proaches, the work o f journalists
and scholars can be com plem en
tary. Castro ’5 Final Hour, by Andres
O ppenheim er o f the Miami Herald,
and Cuban Politics, by R hoda Rab
kin o f Cornell University, are com
plem entary indeed.
O p p en h eim er’s book can be
sum m arized in three words: sex,
drugs, and rock-and-roll. To be
sure, these topics are neglected in
political science scholarship, o u t of
either prejudice against the m un
dane, puritanism , o r lack o f train
ing on how to incorporate them .
O ppenheim er also deals with the
role o f chance, relajo (horsing
around), rum ors, and the sweat of
everyday life, with which scholars
are ill at ease.
O p p en h eim er’s Castro’s Final
Hour starts in the m iddle o f the ac
tion, with the execution o f G eneral
A rnaldo Ochoa, one o f C uba’s
m ost decorated officers, on July 13,
1989. In sharp contrast, the open
ing scene o f Rabkin’s Cuban Politics
sets the stage by introducing the
them e o f objectivity and paradigm s
in the social sciences: “In the social
sciences, objectivity does n o t m ean
the com plete absence o f values and
preconceptions. T hat is impossible.
Moreover, it is also undesirable.
W ithout some guiding sense o f
putative relationships am ong vari
ables, the social scientist could only
record and transm it chaos” (p. 1).
Journalists record and transm it
chaos, albeit in edited fashion.
Scholars crave o rd e r and try to
construct it, even when the o rd er
o f things is disorder.

Castro’s Final Hour promises
thrills and chills, and it delivers.
It is alm ost a ready-made script for
a first-rate television miniseries. Al
though the book reads like fiction,
it isn’t. In politics, as in Pirandello,
the m argins between the real and
the surreal m erge, and O ppen
heim er has captured that gray area
better th an any o th er journalist or
scholar before him. To boot, the
book grabs the reader like few, if
any, others on the subject do.
T he power o f Castro’s Final Hour
is n o t only o f style but o f substance
as well. This book is investigative
reporting at its best. (Eat your
hearts out, Geraldo, O prah, and
Jane!) T he au th o r goes behind the
scene, backstage, to look at the pro
tagonists sans costumes o r m ake
up. W hat O p p en h eim er discovers
and uncovers is a world that rivals
U m berto Eco’s.
As in the works o f Brecht, lan
guage is one o f the central them es
o f O p p en h eim er’s book. O n No
vem ber 2, 1991, when Castro ad
dressed the Prim er Congreso de
Pioneros, he spent m ore than two
hours lecturing on Che Guevara’s
dialectics to an audience o f sixyear-olds (pp. 403-7). Alina Fer
nandez, C astro’s d aughter by Nati
Revuelta, confesses she had to re
sort to the dictionary to find a
word th at described h er father:
“W hen people tell me he is a dicta
tor, I tell them that is n o t the right
word . . . strictly speaking, Fidel is
a tyrant. I have looked up the two
words in the dictionary” (p. 282).
Yet Alina is convinced th at the
majority o f Cubans still support
the “Revolution,” an o th er mis
n o m er for the country’s current
political situation. Reality, and
the interpretation o f it, is a messy
business.

Language is as vital in politics
as it is in dram a. In the streets of
Cuba a new language is being cre
ated daily, challenging the official
discourse o f the state through graf
fiti, slang, double talk, jokes, and
music. In Cuban Politics, Rabkin
transcribes examples o f the em erg
ing alternative vocabulary that cap
tures the new reality (e.g., mayimbe,
pincho—buddies in high places who
act as interm ediaries to get things
done). Likewise, in Castro’s Final
Hour, O ppenheim er records the
lyrics o f a hit song, rife with rhyth
mic double-entendre (p. 265):

In the streets of Cuba
a new language is
being created daily,
challenging the official
discourse of the state
through graffiti, slang,
double talk, jokes, and
music.

“'Guillermo Tell/tu hijo crecio/quiere
tirar la flecha/Le toca a el/probar su
valor/usando tu ballesta” (“William
Tell/your son has grown up/he wants
to shoot the arrow/It’s his turn/to prove
his valor/using your crossbow”) .
Words do no t tell the whole
story, though. W hen they becom e
too dangerous to be spoken, the
characters resort to gestures, signs,
body language, and silence. As
characters speak and act their parts,
conflicts arise. In O p p en h eim er’s
portrayal o f Cuba, the characters,

even when they appear in the lime
light, m isread their lines. Listen,
for instance, to culture m inister
A rm ando H a rt’s m onologue, in
reply to O p p en h eim er’s com m ent
that H art is considered to be one
o f the m ost open-m inded m em bers
o f C astro’s inner circle: “They told
you that? W ho told you that? T hat
is crazy! I d o n ’t consider myself tol
eran t at all! . . . No! No! No! . . .
D on’t you dare accuse m e o f being
tolerant, liberal or anything like
t hat . . .” (p. 312).
O p p en h eim er’s cast is as diverse
as a Cecil B. De Mille production.
T he Cuba he presents is peopled
by babalaos, or santeria priests,
and their oracles (the chorus in a
G reek tragedy?); by Che Guevara’s
grandson, Canek, who dream s n o t
of the jungles o f Bolivia b u t o f be
com ing a rock star (a Broadway
musical?); by Nitza Villapol, the
grandam e o f C uban cuisine who
invents 1,001 ways to eat potatoes
and yells at the au th o r as he leaves
h er apartm ent, “We are standing
up against US aggression. We are
proud of that!” (a candidate for
production by the Instituto del
Cine y Arte Cubano?); by m en and
wom en who find ingenious ways to
resolver, or make do (a version of
the picaresque?); by General
O choa’s widow (a “60 M inutes”
segm ent?); by the C uban mistress
of an international drug trafficker
who plays the role o f fifth business
(a forthcom ing Roxanne Pulitzer
novel?); by Gabriel Garcia M arquez
(with the au th o r seeming to be
com e one o f his characters in The
Autumn of the Patriarch}); by hum anrights activists (a morality play?);
and by spies (a esperpento?). All in
all, O ppenheim er presents a Cu
ban carnival, masks included. The
result is a view o f Cuba th at is far
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R eview Forum

m ore textured, vibrant, and plural
than what Cuban officials and the
theory o f totalitarianism would
have us believe.
Rabkin and O ppenheim er agree
th at Castro has been the leading
m an o f C uban politics since 1959.
Both o f them question w hether the
show can go on w ithout his com
m anding perform ance. Yet, if the
m en and wom en in the streets
are the supporting cast o f O ppen
h eim er’s book, the cast in Rabkin’s
Cuban Politics features n o t only Cas
tro but also the formal institutions
o f political power (the Partido
Com unista de Cuba and the mass
organizations). Making cameo
appearances are Marx, Lenin, de
Tocqueville, Harvard political scien
tist Jorge Dom inguez, and political
writer Carlos Alberto M ontaner,
am ong o th er thinkers whose works
the au th o r uses to help us u n d er
stand C uban politics since 1959.
Like O ppenheim er, Rabkin goes
behind the stage to analyze the
ideas, institutions, and actions that
have shaped Cuban politics since

the advent o f the revolution. U n
like o th er scholars who have writ
ten texts on Cuba, Rabkin pays
attention n o t only to the form al ex
pressions o f political power, but to
the inform al, the subjective, the elu
sive, and the invisible as well (from
the role o f Fidel Castro and the ad
m iration, “bordering on m adness,”
o f his followers, to the “shrewdness
and good luck” that tend to desert
him on econom ic issues). She pep
pers h er discussions o f broader is
sues with anecdotes, rendering
palatable an otherwise bland dis
cussion.
Rabkin is sophisticated in her
analysis, standing am ong two or
three o ther Cubanists in this re
spect. She does no t see the revolu
tion as inevitable. She does no t
exaggerate the power o f the US
over Cuba (p. 145). She presents
contending perspectives (although
the work has a unique voice: Rab
kin is no w im p). These are uncom 
m on finds in the literature on the
politics o f the island, and deserve
applause.

Ayer Antique Books
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Cuba and the Caribbean
Mexico and Central America
South America • Spanish Civil War
Literature • Americana • History
Rare Books • Catalog - $1
7920 SW 94th Court
Miami, FL33173
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Cuban Politics focuses on elites.
From Rabkin’s perspective, elites
make politics. T hroug h o u t history,
political change, according to her,
tends to com e from above. N one
theless, Rabkin, like O ppenheim er,
does not envision a deux ex machina
that will save the day for Cuban
socialism in the 1990s. Both au
thors argue that the die has been
cast, although neither is sure how
the power play will unfold.
In spite o f the differences
between the two books, striking
similarities em erge due to the con
tinuity o f C uban politics over time.
C orruption was as m uch a part o f
the set before Castro as it has been
during his regim e, and probably
will be after his departure. D uring
Fulgencio Batista’s years in power,
“the glittering corruption o f the
capital city was an affront to the
middle-class morals and national
pride . . .” (p. 24), Rabkin writes,
pointing the finger at prostitution,
brothels, and casinos. O ppen
heim er focuses on the “jineteros
and jineteras” (hustlers) th at hang
around hotels looking to trade sex
for dollars o r consum er goods, a
public affront to the revolutionary
(yet equally “bourgeois”) values of
the state.
Can the experim ental produc
tion o f Marxism-Leninism con
tinue to be produced on the Cuban
stage? W hat the scholar and the
journalist seem to say is that the of
ficial perform ance is attracting less
and less o f an audience, because
fewer and fewer Cubans find the
protagonists believable. T heater
and politics, at this point, lose their
power to convince; in short, they
lose their magic. The governm ent
m ight continue perform ing, but
it will be less able to govern as Cu
bans realize that the entire arrange
m ent is “teatro, puro teatro."
As to how and when the curtain
will com e down in this act, both
Rabkin and O ppenheim er leave
us in suspense. In this regard, the
scholar does no t fare any better
than the journalist, because reality
writes itself as it unfolds, outwitting
us all. ■
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THE TIGER AND THE CHILDREN
Fidel Castro and the Judgment of History
Roberto Luque Escalona
Fidel Castro has long claimed that he would be absolved by history.
This volume tests Castro's claim against fact and finds that history will
condemn the long-standing dictator of Cuba. Escalona’s work is filled
with a level of intimate detail unrivaled in any other analysis.

ISBN: 1-56000-027-9 (cloth) 212pp. $29.95
ISBN: 1-56000-593-9 (paper) 212pp. $14.95

POVERTY, NATURAL RESOURCES,
AND PURLIC POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA
U.S.-Third World Policy Perspective Series, No. 17
Sheldon Annis, editor
Rural poverty and environmental degradation are steadily worsening
in Central America,undercutting the prospects for regional peace and
economic recovery.This volume analyzes strategies that aim to re
duce poverty and protect the environment in the region.

ISBN: 1-56000-015-5 (cloth) 280pp. $24.95
ISBN: 1-56000-577-7 (paper) 280pp. $15.95

REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY
A Handbook for Practitioners
Ernesto Betancourt
Betancourt shows how to evaluate the politics and actions of leader
ships in different revolutionary contexts (totalitarian, authoritarian,
and democratic), using the Cuban and Uruguayan experiences as
case studies.

ISBN: 0-88738-411-0 (cloth) 196pp. $29.95

ENVIRONMENT AND LABOR IN THE CARIBBEAN
Caribbean Perspectives, Volume 2
Joseph Lisowski, editor
This volume focuses on the eastern Caribbean, exploring aspects of
management and climate; social, literary, and educational concerns;
and includes an extended study of the labor situation in the U.S.
Virgin Islands.

ISBN: 1-56000-584-X (paper) 128pp. $19.95

CUBA ANNUAL REPORT: 1989
Office of Research and Policy, Voice of America-Radio
Marti Program
United States Information Agency
This annual statistical handbook provides fundamental data on Cuba,
including in-depth reviews of Cuban foreign policy, the national econ
omy, military allocations and manpower, political control, cultural
developments, and ideological shifts.
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Guyana
by Marian Goslinga

he Guyanese National Bibliography, issued quarterly by the National Library (Georgetown, Guyana)
since 1974, provides a com prehensive record o f publishing in the country. In addition, bibliographies
such as Frances C ham bers’s Guyana (Clio Press, 1989) cite works published abroad that deal with the
country. O th er lists have been p rinted since that time, usually appended to current publications. The
following citations date from 1990 and provide the m ost recent inform ation available on various aspects
o f Guyana.

Aroaima Bauxite Hits Output Tar
get: Reynold Venture Seen at Full
in ’92. Bob Regan. American Metal
Market, v. 99, no. 254 (D ecem ber 6,
1991), p. 2-4. [About the Aroaima
Bauxite Com pany in Guyana.]

An Econometric Model o f the Guy
anese Economy, 1957-1976. Leslie
Jarvis. Lanham , Md.: University
Press o f America, 1990. 76 p.

Carib Ethnic Soldiering in Vene
zuela, the Guianas, and the An
tilles. Neil W hitehead. Ethnohistory,
v. 37, no. 4 (1990), p. 557-85.

Ethnic Conflict and Development:
The Case o f Guyana. Ralph R.
Premdas. Geneva: UN Research
Institute for Social Development,
1992. 27 p. [Analyzes the causes
and consequences o f tension be
tween Indians and blacks in Guy
ana.]

Bauxite Processing in Jamaica and
Guyana: An Extension to Aluminum
Smelting. Jam es P. McCoy. World
Development, v. 20, no. 5 (May 1992),
p. 751-66. [Building on previous re
search, this study uses input-output
analysis to estim ate the national
incom e and foreign exchange im
pacts o f alum inum smelting.]

Clive Thomas on the McIntyre Re
port. Clive Yolande Thomas. George
town: W orking P eople’s Alliance,
1990. 8 p. [Contem porary eco
nom ic conditions and policy in
Guyana.]

Bringing Racism into the Open:
Guyanese Action for Reform and
Democracy. William Steif. The
Progressive, v. 54. no. 10 (O ctober
1990), p. 12-14.

Community Involvement in Reha
bilitation Programs for Disabled
Children: A Guyanese Experience.
B. O ’Toole. Community Development
Journal, v. 26, no. 5 (1991), p. 202-9.

The Cambio-System o f an Inde
pendent Exchange-Rate Float:
The Case o f Guyana. C. Thomas,
R. Ram persaud. Social and Economic
Studies, v. 40, no. 4 (Decem ber
1991), p. 115-46. [Examines the
International M onetary F und’s
“cam bio system” o r in d ependent
exchange rate float in effect in
Guyana since M arch 1990.]

Conquering the Useless: El
Dorado’s Imaginary Geographies.
C. Ales, M. Pouyllau. Homme, v. 52,
nos. 2-4 (April-December 1992),
p. 271-508. [Analyzes the search for
El Dorado, the legendary “land of
gold,” which early map-makers indi
cated between the Andes and the
Guianas.]

Marian Goslinga is the Latin Ameri
can and Caribbean librarian at Florida
International University.
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Cambior Eyes Gold in Guyana.
C hristopher M unford. American
Metal Market, v. 98, no. 252 (Decem
ber 31, 1990), p. 2-4.
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East Indians and Anthropologists:
A Critical Review. Steven Vertovec.
Social and Economic Studies, v. 40,
no. 1 (1991), p. 155-69. [Study of
ethnicity, culture, and com m unity
developm ent in Guyana and Trini
dad.]

Ethnic Conflict and Political Con
trol: The Guyana Case. Perry Mars.
Social and Economic Studies, v. 39,
no. 3 (Septem ber 1990), p. 65-94.
Fantasy Play, Language and Cogni
tive Ability o f Four-Year-Old Chil
dren in Guyana, South America.
L. C. Taharally. Child Study Journal,
v. 21, no. 1 (1991), p. 37-56.
Gold Rush Arrives in Guiana
Shield: Bypassed by Major Pro
ducers for Over a Century, Guyana
and Venezuela O ffer Opportuni
ties. Fred Barnard. Engineering and
M iningjoumal, v. 191, no. 8 (August
1990), p. 57-62. [Includes legal and
tax environm ents for m ining in
both countries.]
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Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Pub
lishers, 1992. 95 p. [Proceedings o f
a sem inar held in November 1991
in Coral Gables, Florida, and spon
sored by the Caribbean Resources
Developm ent F oundation in asso
ciation with the North-South Cen
ter o f the University o f Miami and
Florida International University.]

pendence, with em phasis on the
1980s.]

Guyanese Paper Takes Independ
ent Course: Despite Dangers,
Obstacles, “Stabroek News” Is
Growing. William Steif. Editor &
Publisher, v. 123. no. 33 (August 18,
1990), p. 26-28.

Morphosyntactic Acculturation
at the Rural/Urban Interface in
Guyana. W alter F. Edwards. Ameri
can Speech, v. 65, no. 2 (Sum m er
1990), p. 99-114. [Com pares the
incidence o f certain linguistic char
acteristics in the speech o f George
town natives and recent rural
arrivals.]

Hallelujah and the Library in the
Savannahs: Personal Narrative of
Guyana. Jo Pacsoo. Contemporary
Review, v. 256, no. 1489 (February
1990), p. 98-101. [Narrative o f a
volunteer worker am ong Guyana’s
Macusi Indians.]

Guyana Dreaming: The Art o f
Aubrey Williams. Anne Walmsley,
comp. Sydney: D angaroo Press,
1990. 112 p. [Essay on the Guy
anese painter.]
Guyana Food Performance in a
Caribbean Context: Lessons for
Food Security Policy. J. Ford. Food
Policy, v. 17, no. 5 (O ctober 1992),
p. 326-36. [Discusses Guyana’s agri
cultural developm ent policy in the
postindependence period.]

A Handful o f Dust: Return to
Guiana. V. S. Naipaul. The New York
Review of Books, v. 38, no. 7 (April
11, 1991), p. 15-21. [Includes biog
raphies of Cheddi Jagan and Forbes
Burnham .]
Jonestown: Two Faces o f Suicide;
a Durkheimian Analysis. Albert
Black, Jr. Suicide & Life-Threatening
Behavior, v. 20, no. 4 (W inter 1990),
p. 285-306.

Guyana Means Business. Larry
Luxner. Americas, v. 43, no. 1
(January-February 1991), p. 36-42.
[Examines recen t econom ic devel
opm ents with em phasis on the rum
industry.]

A Macroeconomic Model o f the
Guyanese Economy. G. Ganga.
Social and Economic Studies, v. 39,
no. 3 (1990), p. 1-38.

The Guyana Mosaic. RobertJ. Fer
nandes. Georgetown: Guyana Stores,
1990. 56 p. [Pictorial work on con
tem porary Guyana.]

Macroeconomic Modeling and
Policy Analysis for Less Developed
Countries. Mohammed F. Khayum.
Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press,
1991. 203 p. [Includes special sec
tion on Guyana.]

Guyana Seeking a New Future. Ran
dolph Mye. Business America, v. I l l ,
no. 2 (January 29, 1990), p. 8.
Guyana’s Test at High Tide: Prob
lem o f Water Inundation. O m ar
Sattaur. New Scientist, v. 125, no.
1710 (March 31, 1990), p. 46-50.
Guyana: Where Libraries Are an
Endangered Species. Rosa Jordan.

Library Journal, v. 115, no. 7 (April
15, 1990), p. 58-60.

|

The Military and the Politics o f
Change in Guyana. Ivelaw L. Griffith .Journal of Interamerican Studies
and World Affairs, v. 33, no. 2
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